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Market driven product design decisions are receiving increasing attention in the engineering 
design research literature. Econometric models and marketing research techniques are being 
integrated into engineering design in order to assist with profit maximizing product design 
decisions. This stream of research is referred to as “Design for Market Systems” (DMS). The 
existing DMS approaches fall short when the market environment is complex. The complexity 
can be incurred by the uncertain action-reactions of market players which impose unexpected 
market responses to a new design. The complexity can originate from the emergence of a niche 
product which creates a new product market by integrating the features of two or more existing 
products categories. The complexity can also arise when the designer is challenged to handle the 
couplings of outsourced subsystems from suppliers and explore the integration of the product 
with service providers. The objective of the thesis is to overcome such limitations and facilitate 
design decisions by modeling and interpreting the complex market environment. 
The research objective is achieved by three research thrusts. Thrust 1 examines the impact of 
action-reactions of market players on the long and short term design decisions for single category 
products using an agent based simulation approach. Thrust 2 concerns the design decisions for 
 
 
“convergence products”. A convergence product physically integrates two or more existing 
product categories into a common product form. Convergence products make the consumer 
choice behavior and profit implications of design alternatives differ significantly from the 
situation where only a single product market is involved. Thrust 3 explores product design 
decisions while considering the connection to the upstream suppliers and downstream service 
providers. The connection is achieved by a quantitative understanding of interoperability of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATIONS, RESEARCH THRUSTS AND OBJECTIVES 
Design for Market Systems (DMS) is receiving increasing attention in engineering 
design research. Along this line, econometric and marketing research models are 
integrated into decision based design frameworks to represent consumer and firm 
behaviors and estimate demand for design alternatives [e.g., Williams et al, 2008; Shiau 
and Michalek, 2009; Kumar et al, 2009; Frischknecht et al, 2010]. The market systems 
are characterized by the action-reactions of a variety of stakeholders, including 
consumers, competing manufacturers and retailers, who collectively influence the 
demand and profitability of a new product. Market structures can evolve particularly 
when design initiatives are made to blur the boundaries of previous loosely related 
product markets with a new niche product. The evolution of market structure eventually 
reshapes consumer preference and competition, pushing the designers to rethink their 
design decision strategies. Meanwhile, sourcing product subsystems from suppliers and 
integrating consumer products with services are increasingly common in many product 
categories. Such trends are challenging the designer to resolve the couplings of sourced 
subsystems (parts, modules, assemblies) along the upstream market, as well as the 
couplings between the product and service(s) along the downstream market. Yet the 
know-how knowledge for design decisions in engineering design falls short in the 
presence of such complexity. The proposed research aims at overcoming the challenges 
imposed by the complexity of market structures particularly as they affect engineering 
design decision making.   
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This dissertation investigates three research thrusts as shown in Figure 1.1. The first 
thrust, shown with the top panel in Figure 1.1, addresses engineering design decisions 
arising from action-reactions of market players, such as competing manufacturing firms 
and powerful retail channels, for a single product category. The second thrust, the middle 
panel in Figure 1.1, concerns the market driven engineering design decisions for 
“convergence products” which merges the functionalities of existing products and as such 
can open up new market opportunities. The third thrust, the bottom panel in Figure 1.1, 
focuses on the design decisions considering both upstream and downstream market 
system with interoperability considerations, which is particularly important given the 
trends that: (i) increasingly manufacturers are outsourcing subsystems from suppliers (i.e., 
upstream market system), and (ii) in many product markets (e.g., high-tech products such 
as smartphone and tablet computer), the consumers have the option to subscribe to a 
variety of services to use the functionalities of the products (i.e., downstream market 
system). 
 
Figure 1.1 Research Framework and Thrust  
Thrust 1: 
Engineering Design decisions under action-
reactions in the market system for a single 
product category
Thrust 2: 
Engineering design decisions for 
Convergence Products
Thrust 3: 
Engineering design decisions accounting for 







Research Thrust 1: Strategic engineering design decisions for uncertain market 
systems using an agent based approach. 
Objective of Thrust 1: Investigate the long and short term design decisions in the 
presence of action-reactions of market players. 
The demand and profit of a new product can be significantly influenced by the market 
players, such as competing manufacturing firms and retail channels. The competing 
manufacturer firms can adjust prices and/or improve product features in order to battle 
the competitions. Retail channels controlling the access to customers can set the retail 
prices in pursuit of their own profits, which drives the demand for each manufacturer’s 
product. Existing methods in DMS which considers such moves of market players use 
game theoretic models that can maximize a firm’s profit with respect to product design 
and price variables given the Nash equilibrium of the market system. However, the 
existing game theoretic approaches can be limited in a number of ways, e.g., incapable of 
handling action-reactions which involve design of engineering system that are in a black-
box form with discrete, non-differentiable and non-convex functions. In this thrust, an 
agent based approach is proposed for DMS that accounts for learning behaviors of the 
market players under uncertainty. A market system that is modeled with agents 
representing competing manufacturers and retailers who possess learning capabilities and 
based on some pre-specified rules are able to react and make decisions on the product 
design and pricing. The design decision integrates long term design decisions with short 




An article based on this thrust has been published in the Journal of Mechanical 
Design [Wang et al., 2011(a)]. 
Research Thrust 2: Customer driven design decisions  for convergence products. 
Objective of Thrust 2: Construct a profit maximizing design decision framework for 
convergence products. 
Convergence products are multifunctional designs which combine a number of 
distinct functionalities that existing individual products already provide. Examples can be 
found in a broad range of product categories such as office machines (e.g., “all-in-one” 
printers), consumer electronics (e.g., tablet computers) and information products (e.g., 
“Google TV”). Convergence products are becoming popular to both manufacturers and 
consumers for a number of reasons. First, a convergence product is generally built upon 
the technologies of existing products, which can significantly reduce the R&D effort and 
costs. Secondly, a convergence product can be appealing to the consumers who do not 
use the existing products but are interested in a combination of functionalities that a 
convergence product offers. Appealing as it may, a convergence product can be 
complicated to design. A convergence product combines the modules from the existing 
product categories but performs the functionalities in a different way compared to the 
existing products. On the other hand, predicting the demand for convergence products 
can be challenging due to the significant extent of heterogeneity with respect to the 
consumers’ usage and preference of product features. The objective of this thrust is to 
develop a design decision framework that is specifically tailored for convergence 
products and maximizes a company’s profit while considering sustainable future market 
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penetration, by accounting for the consumers’ usages of the functionalities and their 
evolving heterogeneous preferences.  
An article based on this thrust has been published in the Journal of Mechanical 
Design [Wang et al, 2011(b)]. 
Research Thrust 3: Engineering design decisions accounting for both upstream and 
downstream market systems with interoperability considerations. 
Objective of Thrust 3: Develop a mathematical model of system interoperability that 
can be used for product design selection considering: (i) supplier selection along the 
upstream market system, (ii) integration of the physical products with service providers, 
and (iii) both upstream and downstream market systems.  
Outsourcing components, modules, assemblies and so on from suppliers (upstream 
market systems) is replacing “in-house” design and production of many products. Here, a 
product is considered as a system consisting of many coupled components, modules, 
assemblies, or the subsystems. Since the designer does not have the control over the 
design of all the subsystems for a product being outsourced, understanding the 
compatibility (or interoperability) among the subsystems becomes particularly important. 
Variation of the design for one subsystem propagates through to all other subsystems, 
which can be exacerbated when the uncertainties are considered as well. This raises the 
need for a modeling framework in product design selection that accounts for subsystems 
capable of working well with each other under uncertainty. 
Along the downstream market system, consumer product markets are characterized 
by increasingly close connections to the service sectors. Examples include mobile 
electronic devices such as smartphones and tablet computers which enable the consumers 
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to utilize a wide spectrum of services: digital content purchasing, web browsing, social 
network communication, GPS navigation, etc. Selecting service providers to partner with 
in order to achieve the product’s functionalities to the fullest extent possible has become 
a critical task for product designers. On the other hand, consumers enjoy the majority of 
the functionalities of the devices when they are enabled in conjunction with service 
providers’ offerings. The engineering products and the services are thus cast into an 
integral package to deliver value to the customer. Consumer satisfaction is eventually 
driven by the design of the product and the quality of the service in a synergetic manner.  
This thrust aims at a design selection framework which accounts for both upstream 
market system (i.e., suppliers) and downstream market system (i.e., service providers and 
customers) to explore: (i) a mathematical model  for interoperability, (ii) modeling of the 
couplings between the product and the offerings of service providers, and (iii)  the 
integration of upstream and downstream market systems. 
1.2 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION  
This dissertation is organized as in the following (Figure 1.2). Chapter 2 presents an 
agent based approach for design for market systems that accounts for learning behaviors 
of the market players under uncertainty. This chapter addresses the objective of research 
thrust 1. Chapter 3 presents a customer driven optimal design approach for convergence 
products. A modular design decision framework will be presented. Additionally, a 
hierarchical Bayes model is explored to understand the customers’ usage and preferences 
for convergence products. This chapter addresses the objectives of research thrust 2. 
Chapter 4 addresses the third research thrust by investigating a demand/profit 
maximizing design selection method which integrates the considerations for both 
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upstream supplier selection and downstream service provider integration in the market 
system. The integration is based on a mathematical model of system interoperability. 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents concluding remarks, contributions and possible extensions of 
the research presented in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC DESIGN DECISIONS FOR UNCERTAIN MARKET 
SYSTEMS USING AN AGENT BASED APPROACH1 
Market players, such as competing manufacturing firms and retail channels, can 
significantly influence the demand and profit of a new product. Existing methods in 
design for market systems use game theoretic models that can maximize a firm’s profit 
with respect to product design and price variables given the Nash equilibrium of the 
market system. However, in the design for uncertain market systems, there is seldom 
equilibrium with players having fixed strategies in a given time period. In this chapter, an 
agent based approach for design for market systems is presented that accounts for 
learning behaviors of the market players under uncertainty. By learning behaviors it is 
meant that the market players gradually, over time, learn to play with better strategies 
based on action-reaction behaviors of other players. The objective is to model a market 
system with agents representing competing manufacturers and retailers who possess 
learning capabilities and based on some pre-specified rules are able to react and make 
decisions on the product design and pricing. The proposed agent based approach provides 
strategic design and pricing decisions for a manufacturing firm in response to possible 
reactions from market players in the short and long term horizons. The example results 
show that the proposed approach can produce competitive strategies for the firm by 
simulating market players’ learning behaviors when they react only by setting prices, as 
compared to a game theoretic approach.  Furthermore, it can yield profitable product 
design decisions and competitive strategies when competing firms react by changing 
                                                  
1 This chapter addresses Research Thrust 1, as overviewed in Chapter 1. The material for this 
chapter is borrowed from (and is the same as) the paper: Wang, Z., Azarm, S., and Kannan, P. K., 
2011, “Strategic Design Decisions for Uncertain Market Systems Using an Agent Based 




design variables in the short term — a case for which no previous method in design for 
market systems has been reported. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The revenue that can be generated by a new product design is not only closely related 
to its design features but also dependent on the heterogeneous customer preferences and 
competition from competing manufacturing firms. A survey of a number of “Millennium 
Product” prize winning manufacturing companies, most of which small and middle sized, 
has revealed that integrating competitive considerations into product design is a primary 
reason for a firm’s success [Whyte et al., 2003]. Additionally, major retail channels of a 
product category can significantly influence the revenue generation for a product 
[Williams et al., 2008]. It is therefore critical for a designer to consider the market 
environment (i.e., customers, competing firms, retailers) in making product design 
decisions that meet the goals of the firm such as maximizing profit and market 
penetration. While marketing survey techniques such as conjoint analysis [Green and 
Srinivasan, 1978] and others are available to capture customer preferences for a mature 
product category, predicting the behavior of competitors and retailers is more complex. 
An example is a manufacturer who redesigns some of its product features and/or adjusts 
the wholesale price to maintain its competitiveness [Hauser, 1988]. Major retailers make 
acceptance decisions of the new product and may have to rearrange their shelf spaces to 
accommodate a redesigned product [Williams et al., 2008]. These retailers may also have 
to implement pricing strategies such as adjusting retail margins and non-pricing strategies 
such as adding value to products by providing after-sale services [Iyer, 1998]. Major 
design features of a product may remain unchanged for a long time due to the research 
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and development intervals, but action-reactions of market players are observed in a much 
shorter time scale. A seemingly profitable design option at present could become a failure 
when market players make their moves in the future. In order to achieve an overall 
optimal profit, it is therefore vital for the designer to make design decisions on product 
attributes for long term considerations as well as to develop short term design and pricing 
strategies for anticipated reactions from market players. 
Anticipating the reactions from the market players can be challenging in two ways. 
First, the decisions by the rival firms cannot be predicted deterministically. The study by 
Montgomery et al. [Montgomery et al., 2005] of a variety of firms and others [Gurnani 
and Lewis, 2008] reveal that although managers and designers are aware of the past and 
forthcoming actions of rival firms, they seldom can make optimal decisions by taking 
competition into account. It was suggested [Gurnani and Lewis, 2008] that the 
engineering design variables be represented by probability distributions to account for 
possible sub-optimal product design solutions and the probability that market players 
deviate from making optimal decisions. Secondly, market equilibrium arises through a 
process of actions and reactions among market players. Anticipating an action, e.g., a 
pricing decision, from a market player involves solving a decision problem.  For instance, 
when a competing manufacturer makes a move, it solves a decision problem with respect 
to its design and price decisions. Considering the number of market players and their 
corresponding decision space together with the number of their interactions may result in 
a large number of decision options that will have to be resolved.  
Engineering design methods that account for competition are reported in a number of 
existing papers, e.g., [Kumar et al., 2009; Besharati et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2005]. These 
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methods, while accounting for the fact that competing products can influence the demand 
of a new product, ignore potential reactions from competing firms. Several papers, e.g., 
[Hauser, 1988; Ofek and Savary, 2003; Choi et al., 1990; Dawid et al., 2001], consider 
competition for a new product development from a marketing perspective. However, 
these approaches either consider price competition only while ignoring changes in design 
[Choi et al., 1990] or they oversimplify design changes without taking into account 
engineering feasibility [Hauser, 1988; Ofek and Sarvary, 2003; Dawid et al., 2001]. 
Recent literature [Shiau and Michalek, 2009(a); Shiau and Michalek, 2009(b); 
Williams et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2007, Karimian, 2010] introduces product design 
methodologies which account for reactions of competing manufacturing firms and/or 
retail channels using a game theoretic approach. Specifically, a static, non-cooperative, 
one shot game with Nash Equilibrium under pure strategies [Gibbons, 1992] is widely 
used. In the game theoretic models, market players are assumed to pursue their own 
profits and have full information of the other competitors’ strategies in their pursuit of the 
Nash Equilibrium. However, extant work in design for marketing systems using game 
theoretic approaches has three limitations. First, it can lead to a design solution that is 
only guaranteed to be optimal when market players take actions simultaneously. In a real 
world marketplace, such simultaneous moves rarely exist and thus the resulting Nash 
solution can become inapplicable in a real setting. In other words, previous works ignore 
how the equilibrium is arrived at. Secondly, it is assumed that managers and designers are 
able to predict the strategies of rival firms and make appropriate responses accordingly. 
Such assumption contradicts the empirical observations [Montgomery, et al., 2005] 
where managers seldom make decisions by anticipating competitive responses. Finally, 
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the game theoretic approaches [Shiau and Michalek, 2009(a); Shiau and Michalek, 
2009(b); Williams et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2007] rely on formulating first order optimality 
conditions for each player, with respect to the firm’s own decision variables, and solving 
a system of equations for all firms all-at-once. Unfortunately, the first order conditions 
are not applicable to engineering models that are in a black box form with discrete, non-
differentiable and non-convex functions. In the proposed approach, an agent based model 
is used to overcome the shortcomings of the game theoretic approach. An agent based 
model (also referred to as a multi-agent system) refers to a system of agents that 
autonomously make decisions [Wooldridge, 2002] and interact by way of pre-specified 
rules such as learning protocols, to obtain a system level equilibrium [Miller, 2007]. 
Several types of multi-agent learning models are discussed in the literature. These include 
model-based learning, reinforcement learning and no-regret learning [Shoham et al., 
2007]. The first two types have shortcomings that do not fit into our framework. For 
instance, model-based learning entails estimating other agents’ strategies, which can be 
difficult and unrealistic to implement. Also, reinforcement learning is not proved to 
converge in a general setting [Young, 2004]. However, under a no-regret learning 
protocol (also referred to as regret matching), each agent has a probability distribution 
over its decision space representing the chance of making actions in each iteration. This 
distribution (or the potential strategy) can be adaptively updated using a history of past 
actions for all the agents.  The no-regret learning follows the process that a firm devises 
its competitive strategy based on its experience over time. In addition, the no-regret 
learning models have been proved to converge to a “correlated equilibrium” which under 
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certain conditions is equivalent to the Nash Equilibrium under mixed strategies [Moon et 
al., 2008].  
Finally, the literature reports on agent based approaches that have been used in 
solving engineering design problems for a single firm [Moon et al., 2008; Orsborn and 
Cagan, 2009; Campbell et al., 2004; Gorti et al., 1996; Grecu and Brown, 1996; Zhao and 
Jin, 2003]. The market system is either ignored or taken as exogenous in these studies. 
There is no reported product design decision model using an agent based method that 
accounts for the interactions among market players such as competing manufacturing 
firms and retail channels. 
In this chapter, a product design decision making approach is proposed for both long 
term and short term design using an agent based model that is enabled by a multi-agent 
learning scheme. The proposed approach is distinguished from previous literature in that: 
(i) the approach handles competitions that involve designing complex engineering 
products with “black box” functions (i.e., functions that are implicit, discontinuous, non-
differentiable and non-convex); (ii) the design decision accounts for an uncertain market 
system in which players update their strategies by learning; and (iii) an innovative 
concept of integrating long term design decisions with short term design and pricing 
decisions is used to help a manufacturing firm maintain profitability and competitiveness. 
2.2 PROBLEM ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITION 
This chapter aims at a single product design decision methodology for a mature 
product category. A mature product category is characterized by a stable market size and 
a fixed number of competing manufacturing firms and retail channels. Customer 
preferences are assumed to be common knowledge to the firms. The products 
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manufactured by different firms share the same set of attributes and are differentiated by 
the level of attributes. A manufacturer’s wholesale prices for all the retail channels are 
assumed to be identical for simplicity. Also, the retailers are assumed to have common, 
stationary assortment compositions of products. That is, it is assumed that all products 
will be carried by all retailers, and that does not change overtime. 
A “short term design” is defined as a manufacturing firm’s strategy in making a 
minor design change that will serve its respective marketing objective (i.e., profit) in 
response to the actions of other firms in a short time period (e.g., weeks or months). An 
example of such strategies would be to redesign the product in a minor way and mimic 
the product features of competing firms while improving them in order to introduce a 
somewhat new and better product. In contrast, for a long term horizon (e.g., years), a 
“long term design” is defined as a firm’s design decision in the long run which accounts 
for the anticipated reactions from a market system after introducing the new design. The 
combination of all long term design decision options (i.e., long term design subspace) and 
short term design options (i.e., short term design subspace) forms the entire design 
decision space. The combination of these two subspaces provides strategic opportunities 
for both long and short term changes in the product design features for a manufacturing 
firm. Such a hybrid pattern of changes is prevalent in the real-world design for market 
systems. For instance, Toyota introduced the 5th generation (long term design) of its mid-
size sedan “Camry” into the North America market in 2001. The vehicle experienced 
minor improvements, for instance, availability of new customizable options annually 
until 2006 when its 6th generation was introduced with significant changes, e.g., 
modified exterior and interior design as well as the availability of a hybrid version. The 
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time horizon for the design changes can be industry specific. In the automobile industry, 
the “short term” is usually defined by a year while the “long term” can be in a scale of 
about 5 years.  
 
Figure 2.1 Problem Definition 
The problem is defined as follows. A focal manufacturer refers to the one, as shown 
on the top of Figure 2.1, who develops a new product. The focal manufacturer selects the 
best long term design option by accounting for short term market responses. In the 
market system, major retail channels control the product’s access to the customers and 
adjust retail margins in pursuit of their own profit. The competing manufacturers would 
immediately react to the changes in the market system (i.e., changes in designs and 
prices) by adjusting their own product features (i.e., their short term designs) and 
wholesale prices. The interactions in the market system foster changing features and 
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to answer two main questions, as will be explored in this chapter: (i) what is the most 
profitable long term design? (ii) Given the selected long term design, what is the short 
term design and pricing strategy given the action-reactions in the market system? 
2.3 APPROACH 
In the proposed approach, as shown in Figure 2.2, the outer loop (outside the dashed 
block) searches for the most profitable long term design option. While there are a number 
of approaches for generating design alternatives (e.g., [Bryand et al., 2005]), here it is 
assumed that a finite number of candidate long term design alternatives can be identified 
a priori. Each long term (trial) design alternative is then evaluated by the agent based 
model, inside the dashed. The agent based model (i) simulates the market equilibrium for 
the trial design alternative and (ii) iterates to search for the short term design and pricing 
option for the focal manufacturer. All the long term design options will be evaluated with 
respect to a pre-specified objective, i.e., maximum profit or market share.  The optimal 
long term design option can therefore be evaluated for its optimality (in the diamond 
block of the outer loop, Figure 2.2). The overall design decision for the focal firm is the 
combination of (i) the optimal long term design option and (ii) the short term design and 
pricing decision obtained from the market equilibrium.  
In the agent based model, “action” xi
k for agent i is defined as the decision it makes in 
iteration k. For instance, the actions for a manufacturer agent can represent a short term 
engineering design decision. Additionally, “strategy” Si
k(x) of agent i is defined as a joint 
probability density function indicating the chance of playing a particular action x in 
iteration k. For instance, a 4-dimensional multivariate normal distribution can be used to 
represent a retailer’s strategy and indicate the chances that the retailer sets retail margin 
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for the 4 products on its shelves. When an agent makes an action, it draws a sample from 
the strategy. Additionally, an “empirical action profile” EAPi
k(x) is defined as a 
probability density function representing the actions that agent i has played up to the k’th 
iteration in the simulation. EAPi
k(x) is useful in identifying system convergence and 
interpreting equilibrium. It is different from an agent’s strategy Si
k(x) which implies the 
agent’s belief on how the actions should be played.  
As shown in Figure 2.2, the agent based simulation starts with a long term trial design 
option for the focal manufacturer. Market agents, i.e., manufacturing firms and retail 
channels, are initialized with their strategies being uniform distributions. After 
initialization, the agents go through an iterative learning process. An example of a 
learning process is to iteratively observe the payoffs as a result of actions by other agents. 
In this way, in each iteration, the agents update their strategies using a no-regret learning 
algorithm, given the past actions of all agents. The agents then make actions (each agent 
makes one action), i.e., draw samples from their updated strategies and report the actions 
to the agent based system (which simulates the market). In the initial iteration, the agents 
do not need to update strategies and they directly draw actions from the initial uniform 




Figure 2.2 Approach 
algorithm) of the agents are computed after all agents have played their actions. If the 
agent based system is not convergent, the actions of the agents are stored and the control 
is returned to the next iteration. The focal firm is modeled as one of the agents. Therefore, 
the process that the agent based system uses coincides with the process that the focal 
manufacturing firm uses in updating its strategy and searching for the short term design 
and pricing option. When the convergence of the system is reached, the market 
equilibrium solution (i.e., short term design and pricing strategies) will be forwarded to 
the outer loop for evaluating another long term design alternative. After completing the 
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evaluation of all long term and corresponding short term design alternatives, the long and 
short term design alternative with maximum profit can be selected.  
The proposed agent based model is detailed in the following sections. The actions and 
payoffs for the agents are discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. In Section 2.3.3, the no-
regret learning protocol is introduced to model the way that the agents interact. Section 
2.3.4 discusses the convergence of the agent based simulation and the interpretation of 
market equilibrium. Section 3.5 discusses the realism and validation regarding the 
proposed agent based model.  
2.3.1 Agents’ Actions  
Three types of agents are considered in this study. These are agents representing 
manufacturers, retailers and customers.  Each agent has its action space which consists of 
all feasible actions.  
Customer agents. In the proposed approach, customers are modeled as “dummy 
agents”. Customer agents simply make choices to maximize their utilities in any iteration 
and thus neither have actions nor update strategies from a profit maximizing perspective.  
A Multinomial Logit (MNL) model [Anderson, 1992] is used to represent customer 
preferences. MNL builds upon the assumption of a random utility comprising an 
observable part which is a characteristic of the choice and an unobservable part which is 
stochastic, i.e.,   iiu . The entries in i  represent product attributes which can be 
obtained by a mapping from the engineering design space. When the error term ε has a 
double exponential distribution, the probability that a customer chooses a product i 














Coefficient vector β can be estimated based on choice-based conjoint surveys using a 
latent class estimation to account for heterogeneity among customers [Williams et al., 
2008]. The market share of a product alternative can be obtained by summing up the 
































Manufacturer agents. Manufacturer agents are producers of product alternatives in 
the market system. The action of a manufacturer agent at iteration k is represented by a 
vector xi
k combining the engineering design variables zi
k and wholesale price wi




k). The action space Ai for a manufacturer agent is the union of 
engineering design space represented by a set of inequality constraints and the domain of 














Retailer agents. Typical retailer behavior includes: (i) acceptance [Williams et al., 
2008]—what product to carry in a category given the limited shelf space; (ii) pricing 
[Shiau and Michalek, 2009(b)]—what retail margin for the product should be considered? 
Both acceptance and pricing decisions by the retailers have significant impact on 
manufacturers’ profits. Assuming there are a total number of n products, the action of a 




2.3.2 Agents’ Payoffs 
Since manufacturing firms and retailers are all assumed to be profit seeking, their 
payoffs are aligned with profits—in the following sections, the payoffs of all agents will 
be equivalent to their profits.  
In an agent based model, each agent’s payoff is influenced by the joint actions of all 
agents. Therefore, the payoff for an agent is a mapping from the union of all agents’ 
action spaces to the real number space: RAAA: N P 21 . Assuming there are Nm 
manufacturer agents and Nr retailer agents, the joint actions of all agents at iteration k is 
denoted by: xk=(x1
k, x2
k,…, x Nm + Nr
 k). Also, denote the actions of all agents but agent i at 





k ,x Nm + Nr
 k).  
A preliminary step for the assignment of payoffs for manufacturer and retailer agents 
is to obtain market shares. Consistent with the market structure, market share at iteration 
k can be denoted by an m by n matrix Mk= (mij
k)mxn, with each entry mij
k
 denoting the 
market share of product i sold by retailer j at iteration k. The market consists of L 
segments with the size of each segment denoted by sl. Therefore, out of a total number of 
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Manufacturer agents. The payoff of a manufacturer agent can be obtained by 
summing up the multiplication of net profit and market share at every retail channel that 


























m xC . The marginal cost can be formulated as a linear function of design 
features, as practiced in [Williams et al., 2008]. The cost model can be estimated by a 
linear regression procedure using past production data which are easily accessible for a 
mature product category. 
Retailer agents. The payoff of a retailer agent is the summation of profits generated 















2.3.3 Protocol and Agent Strategies  
The following assumptions are made regarding the short term actions of the market 
players: (i) they make decisions independently; (ii) they have no knowledge about the 
payoff functions and strategies of other players, though they know the payoff functions of 
their own and can observe the actions played by other players; (iii) they learn to improve 
their strategies overtime. 
The No-Regret Matching (NRM) algorithm [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000] is 
implemented to represent the market players’ learning behaviors. The learning is carried 
out by examining “regrets”. Observing the past actions of all the other agents in each 
iteration, the regret value for a specific action is measured by the difference between (i) 
the average payoff that the agent could have received if this action had been played all 
the time and (ii) the average payoff it has actually received. An action having a negative 
regret will not be played in the next iteration since the agent believes that such an action 
may not bring an attractive payoff according to the its experience, i.e., the payoff 
difference. An action with a positive regret, on the other hand, will be assigned a 
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probability proportional to the regret value which implies the likelihood that this action 
will be played in the next iteration. Following the regret update algorithm introduced by 






























Here the subscript “-i” denotes all the agents but agent i. 
The initial regret value R0 is set to 0 because agents do not have regrets when no 
actions have been taken at the first iteration. Once the joint actions are obtained, an agent 
would have access to the updated regret since it has full knowledge of its own payoff 
function. However, the agents cannot guess the regret of other agents. 
Given the regret function, the agents can specify their strategies. Marden et al. 

























































denotes the positive regrets. Eqn. (2.8) can be interpreted as follows. The probability of 
playing an action is proportional to its regret value. In order to guarantee that the 
probability over the action space sums to one, the strategy function is weighted by the 
sum of all positive regret values. 
In an engineering product design decision problem, the above formulation is 
insufficient for representing the agents’ actions since pricing decisions belong to the 
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continuous real number domain. An improved formulation is proposed here to address 
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It can be easily verified that  xS ki specified by Eqn. (2.9) sums up to one over the 
action space. 
Meanwhile, the product design decisions are characterized by mixed discrete and 
continuous variables. The actions of a manufacturer agent are denoted by separating the 
discrete actions zd which may represent discrete engineering design variables and 
continuous actions zc which represents the continuous engineering design variables and 
wholesale price: z=(zc , zd). Thus, the following equation sets strategy of a manufacturer 































Eqn. (2.10) is different from Eqn. (2.9) in that the denominator accounts for both 
continuous and discrete design variables. The denominator is obtained by first integrating 
over the space of continuous variables while taking discrete variables as fixed, then 
summing over all the feasible values of the discrete variables. The denominator of the 
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strategy function in Eqn. (2.10) involves integrations and summations which cannot be 
obtained analytically. Meanwhile, evaluating the probability distribution function of the 
strategy for a manufacturer agent involves assessing its action’s feasibility by evaluating 
engineering constraints. Overall, the strategy functions are in a blackbox form and cannot 
be sampled analytically.  
As discussed earlier, the agents play actions in each iteration by drawing samples 
from their strategies. The strategy as given by Eqn. (2.10) is not in the form of any 
standard distribution, which makes it difficult to sample. For implementation purpose, a 
numerical sampling technique is used, i.e., slice sampler, to draw samples from a black 
box probability density function. A slice sampler [Nean, 2003] is one of the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling techniques. The sampler creates a chain of sample 
points out of a given density function. When the chain of samples converges, the 
sequence of samples can be taken as an approximation to the original probability density 
function. The slice sampler can bring significant computational convenience to our 
approach because the sampler only requires knowing the density function to a 
proportional constant, that is, only the numerators in Eqn. (2.9) and Eqn. (2.10) need to 
be known. This property of slice sampler offers a way to circumvent the evaluation of 
complicated integrations and summations in the strategy functions. Practically, the 
generation of agents’ actions can be accomplished by plugging the regret value (i.e., the 
numerators in the strategy functions), if positive, into a slice sampler and by obtaining a 
chain of samples representing the agents’ strategy. In this study, the slice sampler is 
applied as a black box function: using the “slicesample’ function from the Statistics 
Toolbox in Matlab 2010a [MathWorks, 2010]. In each iteration of the agent based 
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simulation, an agent creates a chain of samples based on the updated strategy using the 
slice sampler. It takes the convergent portion of the chain and draws one sample from it. 
This sample is taken as the action that the agent will report to the agent based system at 
the current iteration. 
2.3.4 Market Equilibrium and Convergence  
The proposed agent based simulation process needs to be run long enough in order to 
reach an interpretable equilibrium. No-regret matching algorithms, as indicated by the 
terminology, are proved to asymptotically converge to “no-regret” equilibrium where the 
regret for each agent approaches zero [Marden et al., 2007]. The equilibrium is 
interpreted as a “correlated equilibrium” which was first discussed by Aumann [Aumann, 
1974]. Simply put, agents at equilibrium would have “no-regret” of playing random 
draws according to their strategies, given the history of interaction. Hart and Mas-Colell 
[Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000] provided analytical proofs that the empirical distributions of 
agents’ actions (i.e., defined as EAPi
k(x) in this study) will converge to correlated 
equilibrium under the no-regret matching algorithm. Marden et al. proved that NRM 
converged to Nash Equilibrium in a “weakly acyclic game” [Marden et al., 2007]. In our 
case studies, convergence is observed even without those assumptions. However, due to 
the complexity of the decision problems for each agent in this study (e.g., decision spaces 
bounded by nonlinear and even “black-box” constraints), the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibrium can be difficult to prove. 
It is worth noting that the “asymptotical convergence” [Marden et al., 2007] to zero 
regret may not be a desirable convergence criterion since it may require infinite number 
of iterations. As an alternative, an Empirical Convergence Index (ECI) is defined to 
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identify the convergence. ECI is defined as the change of the empirical action profile, i.e., 
EAPi
k(x), in two consecutive iterations. As given by Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart and Mas-
Colell, 2000], the equilibrium strategy of an agent is represented by its EAPi
k(x). When 
the changes of EAPi
k(x) remain small enough for a certain number of iterations, it implies 
the convergence of the system. The ECI can be obtained by the following procedure.  
First, empirical action profile is constructed: EAPi
k(x). The actions that have been 





k}. Each observation xi
k is a vector, e.g., containing wholesale prices as well as 
engineering designs for a manufacturer agent. Therefore, EAPi
k(x) will be a multivariate 
density function. For the ease of interpretation, EAPi
k(x) is substituted by univariate 
functions EAPih
k(x) corresponding to the marginal distributions for each dimension of the 
agent’s actions. The observations for the h’th dimension can be obtained by ignoring the 




k}. A density function is then 
extrapolated from the observations using the kernel smoothing estimation technique—a 
non-parametric summarization of the underlying distribution structure of the observations. 
A number of numerical estimation toolboxes are available to use, for instance, Statistic 
Toolbox in Matlab offers a normal kernel estimation function. The results of the kernel 
smoothing estimation are vectors of samples representing the smoothed estimate of 
EAPih
k(x).  
Secondly, a vector of quantiles representing the shape of EAPih
k(x) is obtained. For 
instance, quantiles  of 2.5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 97.5% can be used for computing ECI 






where J is the total number of quantiles to be computed. ECI for agent i in iteration k is 












































Eqn. (2.11) represents changes in the EAPi
k(x) compared to the previous iteration. It is 
the summation of the changes of empirical profiles in each dimension of an agent’s 
actions. The variations in the shape of profiles are represented by the averaged distance 
between the corresponding quantiles in two consecutive iterations scaled by the term 
“ )min()max( khj
k
hj qq  ”.  
The convergence criterion is defined as the following. For a given tolerance value εc 
and step parameter Tc, the agent based simulation is said to be converged up to iteration k 
if the following condition is met for any agent i:  
c
t
icc ECI:}k,k,,Tk,Tk{t  11  
(2.12) 
 
2.3.5 Realism and Validation 
The usage of “no regret” learning behavior is indeed motivated by the fact that 
managers, when making a decision, take the past into account. They tend to give favor to 
the strategies that “could have worked better” in the past—a tendency to reduce “regret”. 
Such type of behavior was reflected in the work by Montgomery et al. [Montgomery et 
al., 2005]. The majority of managers were observed to take the past behaviors of 
competitors into account when making decisions on new product design and/or pricing; 
hardly any managers, on the other hand, were reported to account for future competitor’s 
reactions. However, it is necessary to point out that the learning algorithm in the agent 
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based simulation does not mimic the real world behaviors of individual firms. It is not 
appropriate  to take the agent based simulation process as a “step by step” prediction of 
the future moves of market players.  
Fully validating the agent based simulation can be difficult but it is indeed verifiable. 
The research in behavioral game theory [Camerer, 2003] indicates that learning behaviors 
of social agents are only experimentally observed under limited circumstances. Using the 
real market data (i.e., price adjustments and feature changes) to examine the validity of 
the model can be potentially risky. Additionally, there can be a variety of other forces 
(i.e., entry of new competitors, advertisement and promotions) which are attributable to 
the firms’ behaviors so an isolated market system is rarely available. Although validating 
the dynamic behavior is challenging, verifying the equilibrium is not. For instance, it is 
possible to verify if the result is indeed equilibrium. Upon convergence to equilibrium, 
the strategies (i.e., EAPi
k(x)) of the agents are supposed to remain stable. This can be 
verified by looking at the convergence criterion proposed in the Section 2.3.4. This 
procedure is followed in the case studies. A more rigorous verification can be by 
matching the strategies obtained in the simulation to the definition of correlated 
equilibrium [Aumann, 1974] at which the no regret learning is supposed to converge. Part 
of the model, e.g., the representation of the choice behaviors of Customer agents using a 
Multinomial Logit model, has roots in consumer utility theories and can be verified by 
fitting the data collected from conjoint surveys [Green and Srinivasan, 1978]. 
2.4  CASE STUDY 
The case study is formulated by extending the design problem of a cordless angle 
grinder, which was proposed in the previous literature [Williams et al., 2008]. The angle 
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grinder is a typical engineering product with subsystems such as motor, transmission and 
housing. The market for angle grinders is characterized by a number of major 
manufacturers such as DeWalt, Bosch and Milwaukee and a few powerful retailers such 
as Home Depot and Lowe’s. 
 
Table 2.1 Design variables of a cordless angle grinder 
Description Design Var. Unit Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Long term design variables 
Armature turns Nc turns 20 300 
Stator turns Ns turns 10 200 
Stator outer radius Ro mm 10 100 
Stator thickness T mm 0.1 100 
Gap thickness Lgap mm 0.05 70 
Pinion Pitch Dp mm 9 30 
Stack length L mm 10 200 
Switch Type S N/A 1 4 
Short term design variables 
Current I amps 6 12 
Gear ratio R N/A 0.2 4 
 
2.4.1 Engineering Design Model  
The design variables for a cordless angle grinder are detailed in Table 2.1.  Some of 
the variables are discrete, i.e., “Armature turns”, “Stator turns” and “Switch Type”. The 
variables “Current” and “Gear Ratio” are assigned to represent short term design changes, 
with the rest representing long term design. Such assignment is in favor of the 
convenience of demonstration since varying the “Current” and “Gear Ratio” is observed 
to change the market share of a product noticeably. Three long term design alternatives 
are considered in the study. Specifically, random values are generated for long term 
design variables except “Switch Type” and make the values identical across all the three 
alternatives. Therefore, the alternatives are differentiated, with respect to long term 
features, exclusively by the variable “Switch Type”. The engineering constraints and the 
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cost model are consistent with those presented in the reference [Williams et al., 2008]. A 
mapping from the engineering design space to the customer observed attributes is also 
available in the literature [Williams et al., 2008]. 
2.4.2 Case Study Scenarios  
Three case study scenarios are considered. The agent based model in each subsequent 
scenario builds upon that of the previous scenario and fosters increasingly complex 
market systems, as summarized in Table 2.2.  











Scenario 1 X   
Scenario 2 X X  
Scenario 3 X X X 
 
In scenario 1, the manufacturer agents only change wholesale prices and the retailers’ 
margins are fixed. An arbitrarily chosen design alternative will be evaluated by using the 
agent based approach and game theoretic approach, and the results will be compared. 
Specifically, the “correlated equilibrium” market response anticipated by the agent based 
model will be compared to the Nash Equilibrium obtained using a game theoretic 
approach. Scenario 1 mirrors the commonly known price competition problem which can 
be solved using a game theoretic approach. Under the assumption of a multinomial logit 
(MNL) demand model, the price competition problem can be proved to have a unique 
Nash Equilibrium [Anderson et al., 1992]. The Nash Equilibrium can be obtained by 
setting the first order derivatives of the manufacturer agents’ payoff functions with 
respect to their wholesale prices equal to zeros and solving a system of non-linear 
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equations. As such, a numerical minimization approach is adopted and is shown in Eqn. 
(2.13): 
In scenario 2, retailer duopolies are added in and examine their impacts using the 
agent based approach. Since a choice model which incorporates heterogeneity and 
consider retailer duopoly is adopted, to the best of our knowledge there is no analytical 
proof that a unique Nash equilibrium exists under such setting. In contrast, the proposed 
agent based model will be shown to converge to equilibrium solutions of mixed strategies. 
The reason is that the analytical proof [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000] regarding the NRM 
algorithm does not depend on the properties such as concavity of payoff functions, and 
therefore is not affected by the complications in this setting. This scenario serves as an 
intermediate step between scenarios 1 and 3. 
In scenario 3, long term design alternatives are evaluated and selected using the 
proposed approach. In both scenario 2 and 3, the competition involves either non-concave 
profit functions for the market players or non-convex action spaces for engineering 
design actions. For demonstration purposes, the long term product design decision space 
is kept small with a finite number of design options, as shown in Table 2.3. Each 
alternative will be evaluated using the agent based model for its profitability. Given the 
profit that each alternative generates overtime, the most profitable long term design 
option can then be selected as the long term design. Correspondingly, the strategy of the 
focal firm in the agent based model is selected as the short term design. It is assumed that 




2.4.2 Modeling Agents  
Customer agents. In the angle grinder example, the customer’s utility coefficients 
can be estimated through analyzing choice based conjoint surveys, which results in 4 
segments with diverse preferences. The segment sizes (in percentage) are 36.40%, 
26.62%, 13.17% and 23.81%. The values of coefficients for the demand model are 
available in [Williams et al., 2008].  
Manufacturer agents. The agent based system consists of 4 different manufacturer 
agents performing short term designs and pricing of their angle grinders. Manufacturer 4 
is the focal firm. The engineering design action space of each manufacturer is assumed to 
be the same, as defined by the lower and upper bounds in Table 2 and a number of 
engineering constraints [Williams et al., 2008]. In scenario 1 and 2, the designs of 
manufacturing agents are fixed, as given in Table 2.3. In scenario 3, the competitors 
change their short term designs while maintaining the values for long term design 
variables given in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.3 Long term design options 
Design 
Variables 
Nc Ns Ro T Lgap 
Alt. #1 262 97 46.9 34.0 0.28 
Alt. #2 262 97 46.9 34.0 0.28 
Alt. #3 262 97 46.9 34.0 0.28 
Design 
Variables 
I L R Dp S 
Alt. #1 6 126.1 0.47 9.1 1 
Alt. #2 6 126.1 0.47 9.1 3 




Table 2.4 Design variables of competing 
manufacturers 
 Nc Ns Ro T Lgap 
Mfr 1 297 75 68.1 48.7 0.07 
Mfr 2 286 101 47.6 31.2 0.13 
Mfr 3 300 69 52.1 28.1 0.06 
Mfr 4 262 97 46.9 34.0 0.28 
 Dp L S I R 
Mfr 1 23.7 193.3 1 6 0.35 
Mfr 2 21.0 161.3 4 9 1.14 
Mfr 3 11.7 199 3 12 3.94 
Mfr 4 9.1 126.1 3 6 0.47 
 
Retailer agents. A retailer duopoly setting (i.e., two competing retailers) is used in 
the case study. Specifically, it is presumed that two retailer agents carry all the angle 
grinders produced by the 4 manufacturer agents. In the first scenario, the retailers are 
assumed to have constant retail margins as given in Table 2.5. In scenario 2 and 3, the 
retailers will react to the changes in the market system by setting retail margins over their 
assortments.  
Table 2.5 Default retail margins 
 Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4 
Retailer 1 $48 $45 $55 $43 
Retailer 2 $30 $31 $30 $43 
 
2.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
2.5.1 Scenario 1: Anticipating Wholesale Price Responses of Competitors to the New 
Product 
Game theoretic approach yields the Nash Equilibrium prices of a non-cooperative 
game under pure strategies. The equilibrium prices and corresponding profits are 
presented in Table 2.6. The price set by Firm 3 is much higher than the other firms, which 




Table 2.6 Nash equilibrium for price competition 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 (Focal) 
Price ($) 53.5 52.7 352.0 70.3 
Profit ($M) 11.5 4.8 38.8 17.6 
 
The proposed agent based approach simulates a process through which firms 
converge to equilibrium of mixed strategy by learning.  The empirical action profiles (i.e., 
EAPi
k(x)) of the firms are in Figure 2.3 (a) to Figure 2.3 (d).  
There are two significant observations, as can be seen in Figure 2.3, regarding the 
empirical action profiles: shifting and shrinking. The shifting of the profile implies the 
changes in the potentially more profitable pricing option. The shrinking reveals the 
strengthening of an agent’s belief on the pricing strategy, as more action-reaction history 
data becomes available. The “shift” can usually be observed at the beginning of 
simulation when agents learn to find more profitable actions; the “shrinking” often appear 
toward the convergence of the simulation when agents stop shifting the profiles. In Figure 




Figure 2.3 Result of scenario 1: (a) to (d) empirical action profile for manufacturer 
agent 1 to 4; (e) agent payoffs; (f) empirical convergence index 
Figure 2.3(f) shows the process that ECI of each agent approaches zero—the criterion for 
the convergence of the simulation. The tolerance and step parameters are set as: εc=0.05 
and Tc=20, respectively. 
Comparing the results in Table 2.6 and Figure 2.3, the mean values of the pricing 
strategies obtained by the agent based approach appear to be close to the Nash 
Equilibrium prices obtained by the game theoretic approach. Therefore, both approaches 
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can be used to model the price competition and obtain similar results. However, it is 
necessary to clarify that this closeness does not imply equivalence. The game theoretic 
approach yields equilibrium in pure strategies—the players’ actions are deterministic. 
The agent based approach, in comparison, leads to the equilibrium in mixed strategies—
the players have probabilities of playing a certain action.  
2.5.2 Scenario 2: Anticipating Wholesale Price Responses of Competitors and Retail 
Margin Changes of Duopoly Retailers 
In this scenario, the first scenario is extended by allowing retailer duopolies to 
respond to the new product by adjusting margins. Adding more agents may make the 
environment more complex to “learn”. It can be more difficult for an agent to see the 
difference in terms of profit between two feasible actions, since any changes in another 
agent’s behavior can flip the comparison between the two. The more agents in the model, 
the more uncertainties are introduced. It is worth noting that the customer choice model 
incorporates the preferences for the two retailers and therefore makes them differentiated 
in the simulation. In the simulation results, retailer 1 tends to set high margins across the 
products it carries, which indicates that it learns overtime that the customers’ purchase 
behaviors are less affected by the its price changes. Meanwhile, it achieves high profit 
over the iterations as compared to retailer 2, which indicates its dominating position in 
the retail market. In contrast, retailer 2 restricts its margins, on the average, to be lower 
than those of retailer 1 except for product 3—a higher-end product expensively priced as 
discussed in scenario 1. The profits of manufacturers 1, 2, and 4 (focal) remain at the 
same level as they did in the first scenario where retail margins are kept constant. The 
profit of manufacturer 3 experienced a significant drop due to the extra margin extracted 
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by retailers which results in an excessively high retail price that drives many customers 
away. 
2.5.3 Scenario 3: Selecting Long Term Design Alternatives under both Price and 
Design Changes in a Market System  
In this scenario, the proposed agent based design approach is applied to select long 
term design alternatives. Each long term design alternative goes through the agent based 
model for evaluation to obtain: (i) the profit for the focal firm towards the equilibrium, as 
shown on the left of Figure 2.4, and (ii) the short term design and pricing strategy for the 
focal firm, as shown on the right in Figure 2.4. The “Long Term Design Alternative 2” 
(which is the same design the focal firm has in scenario 1) is the most profitable one 
among the three options. 
One important observation is that the profit for the focal firm gradually drops to 
around $5M when competitors learn to change prices and short term designs, compared 
to that around $15M when competitors only adjust prices in scenario 1. Based on the 
observation in this case study, the focal firm could be significantly overestimating its 
profit when developing a new product without anticipating the short term design changes 
of the competitors.  
The right half of Figure 2.4 exhibits how the short term competing strategy, i.e., 
pricing and short term design, for the focal firm is obtained given the most profitable long 
term design alternative. The empirical action profile for pricing decision features a “shift” 
from an initially higher price to a less expensive price. Additionally, the “Gear Ratio” 
design strategy changes from an initial bimodal profile to a unimodal profile, which 
reveals the process through which the firm strengthens its belief on profitable short term 
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designs by learning. When competing firms gradually revise some design features and 
change prices to counter the new product, the new product may not generate as much 
profit for the focal firm as it does right after its entrance into the market. The competition 
actually forces the focal firm to consider price cuts and continue to revise the short term 
design features of the new product in order to maintain the profitability. Empirically, the 
short term design and pricing strategies need to be appropriately interpreted. There can be 
noticeable deviations in the distributions (e.g., the gear ratio strategy as shown in Figure 
4) due to the randomizing nature of all the agents. Therefore, the designer should be 
provided not only the “peak” but also the “spread” regarding its strategies. For instance, 
the designer will be suggested to give the peak value priority but still consider other 
options within the 90% confidence interval for the gear ratio design strategy. 
Meanwhile, the overall performance of the firms in terms of market shares and how 
they target the 4 different market segments in the short term horizon are analyzed. 
Manufacturer 1 is a small business with its shares in each segment below 10%. 
Manufacturer 2 dominates segment 2 by a share of 70%. Manufacturer 3 played as a 
monopoly in the third segment with the share of almost 100%. The focal firm 
(manufacturer 4) targets segment 1 with a share of about 30%.   
Finally, it is necessary to point out that only a very limited number of options are 
compared for the focal manufacturer in the long term design space. There can be a much 
larger set of long term options to be considered. For instance, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted for every long term design alternative by perturbing the outer radius R0 of the 
motor by 5%. As shown in Figure 2.4, by increasing R0 by 5% based on alternative 2, the 
focal firm would have achieved a profit for another $2M. Conversely, the profit for 
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alternative 2 can fall below that of alternative 1 as well, which leads to the change of 
optimal long term design option. Additionally, a long term design alternative can exhibit 
varied sensitivity to different design variables. The sensitivity of alternative 2 is also 
tested regarding the “Stack length” denoted by L. This alternative is shown to be much 
less sensitive to L. 
 
Figure 2.4 Results of Scenario 3 
The simulations are programmed in Matlab and run on a desktop workstation with an 
8 core CPU of 2.99GHz and 4GB memory. Parallel computing is used. For a given long 
term design alternative, the total computational time of the agent based simulation is 
approximately 9.67 hours for 150 iterations.  
2.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, an agent based approach is proposed for strategic design decisions in 
an uncertain market environment. The proposed approach overcomes the short comings 
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of previous approaches and is capable of handling competition involving complex design 
problems in which engineering systems is in black box form. Moreover, a more realistic 
perspective is taken in modeling the uncertain market system and accounting for the 
action-reactions among market players with learning behavior. Additionally, the 
approach provides the designer (i) a long term design decision which targets long term 
profitability and (ii) a short term design and pricing strategy which helps to maintain 
competitiveness in a short term horizon. 
The proposed approach evaluates long term design alternatives and searches the short 
term design space using an agent based model. Market players such as competing 
manufacturing firms and retail channels are modeled as learning agents. A no-regret 
learning algorithm is used to model the market system and equilibrium of the system can 
be analytically guaranteed. In the case studies, the proposed approach is compared with 
the game theoretic approach reported in the previous literature. Our current results 
indicate that when competing manufacturing firms compete on pricing, the agent based 
approach results in a similar prediction of the market equilibrium compared to the game 
theoretic approach. The result also suggests that a firm can establish long term advantage 
in profit by strategically selecting design alternatives.  
The next chapter will present a customer driven optimal design method for 
convergence products. Instead of focusing on the action-reactions of an existing (mature) 
product category, the next chapter aims at the design decisions in emerging product 
categories which integrates the features of existing product.   
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CHAPTER 3: CUSTOMER-DRIVEN OPTIMAL DESIGN FOR CONVERGENCE 
PRODUCTS2 
Convergence products are multifunctional designs which are changing the way 
consumers use existing functionalities. Manufacturers’ ventures in developing 
convergence products abound in the marketplace. Smartphones, tablet computers, internet 
TV, are just a few examples. The complexity of designing a convergence product can 
differ significantly from that of single function products which most research in Design 
for Market Systems aims at.  
In this chapter, a new customer-driven approach for designing convergence products 
is proposed to address the following issues: (i) a design representation scheme that 
considers information from design solutions used in existing products: the representation 
facilitates the coupling of and combining multiple functionalities; (ii) a hierarchical 
Bayes model that evaluates consumers’ heterogeneous choices while revealing how usage 
of multiple functionalities impacts consumers’ preferences; and (iii) design metrics which 
help evaluate profitability of design alternatives and account for future market 
penetration given evolving consumer preferences. An example problem for designing a 
tablet computer is used to demonstrate the proposed approach. The data for the example 
is collected by conducting a choice-based conjoint survey which yielded 92 responses. 
The proposed approach is demonstrated with three scenarios differentiated by the 
consideration of consumer heterogeneity and future market penetration, while comparing 
how the resulting optimal design solutions for the convergence product differ. 
                                                  
2 This chapter addresses Research Thrust 2, as overviewed in Chapter 1. The material for this 
chapter is borrowed from (and is the same as) the paper: Wang, Z., Kannan, P.K., and Azarm, S., 
2011, “Customer-Driven Optimal Design for Convergence Products”, Journal of Mechanical 




Consumers nowadays are facing a wide variety of new products which combine a 
number of distinct functionalities3 that existing individual products already provide. Such 
products are found in a broad range of categories such as office machines (e.g., all-in-one 
printers), consumer electronics (e.g., tablet computers) and information products (e.g., 
Google TV). These products usually straddle two or more existing product categories by 
merging their previously developed and separate underlying technologies, which give rise 
to their name Convergence Products [Han et al., 2009]. Successfully developing a 
convergence product can greatly benefit a company in a number of ways. First, a 
convergence product is generally built upon the technologies of existing products, which 
can significantly reduce the R&D effort and costs. Secondly, a convergence product can 
attract new customers who do not use the existing products but are interested in a 
combination of functionalities that a convergence product offers. Moreover, convergence 
products can open up new product-market opportunity gaps (Figure 3.1) which can lead 
the firm to a position in the market where little or no direct competition exists. Appealing 
as it may be, a convergence product can be complicated to design. The success or failure 
of a convergence product can be closely related to the decisions in the early stages of 
design, yet little research has been conducted on a customer-driven design decision 
approach that is applicable to convergence products. 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a design decision framework that 
maximizes a company’s profit while considering sustainable future market penetration, 
by accounting for the consumers’ usages of the functionalities and their evolving 
                                                  
3 Functionality here is defined as the capacity of a product to fulfill a useful function and satisfy a 
customer need, e.g., a useful function that an iPad can fulfill is reading a book or magazine. 
Functionality can also refer to a “feature” of a product, e.g., iPad has an “e-book reading” feature. 
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heterogeneous preferences. While some convergence products flourish partly due to their 
improved user interface and software applications (e.g., tablet computers, smartphones), 
this study focuses primarily on the design decisions of the hardware and product features. 
However, studies using prototypes (e.g., Luo et al., 2008) can be employed to focus on 
perceived attributes such as screen quality, software ease of use, etc.. The proposed 
objective and framework differs from existing literature in three significant ways, which 
are elaborated below.  
  
Figure 3.1 Opportunity Gaps for Convergence Products 
 
First, a modular design representation scheme is proposed to integrate the design 
solutions from multiple existing product categories to generate design alternatives for a 
convergence product. The scheme accounts for the coupling of subsystems 
(functionalities) due to the very nature of a convergence product. Chen et al. [Chen et al., 
2010] investigate the planning of fusion products (single product that operates multiple 
functionalities—a definition that is close to that of a convergence product) to maximize 
profit but overlook the engineering design aspect and consumer preferences for such 
products. Existing works in engineering design focus on the design of single category 
products [e.g., Li and Azarm, 2000], product line [e.g., Thevenot and Simpson, 2009] and 
gaps for convergence products
smart 
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product platforms [e.g., Fellini et al., 2005]. Single product design methods do not handle 
the couplings of multiple products or functionalities. Product line/platform design 
approaches, on the other hand, consider the connections and variations among multiple 
products but are limited to the design of products falling under a single category. The 
practice of bringing different product categories together is called “bundling” 
[Stremersch and Tellis, 2002; Chung and Rao, 2003]. The recent work by Williams et al. 
[Williams et al., 2010] introduces a methodology to design a bundle of multi-category 
products but does not lead to design concepts that cast the functionalities into a single 
product.  Meanwhile, modular design has been widely applied in the industry and 
existing literature have focused on the analysis of modularity [e.g., McAdams et al., 
1999], and designing product line and/or platform [e.g., Gao et al., 2009; Dobrescu and 
Reich, 2003]. The proposed approach extends these works by enabling the integration of 
modular structures of different products/functionalities into one integrated framework. 
Additionally, the design decision for a convergence product requires bridging the 
parametric design stage and the concept selection stage, while accounting for how 
consumers will react to new designs. Existing engineering design methods in the design 
for market systems [e.g., Shiau and Michalek, 2009; Tucker and Kim, 2008; Kumar et al., 
2009] are primarily useful to make parametric decisions with fixed modular structures of 
the functionality, with design concepts for the functionalities selected a priori.  
Secondly, the approach in this chapter accounts for the consumers’ heterogeneous 
choice behavior using a hierarchical Bayes model with its second level explaining how 
the consumers’ usages of the existing functionalities influence their preferences for the 
attributes of the convergence product. Early approaches such as House of Quality 
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[Hauser and Clausing, 1988] collect customer needs and map them to the design 
specifications in a qualitative manner. Recent works in the area of design for market 
systems adapt econometric models to quantitatively measure the relationship between 
design alternatives and consumer choice [Frischknecht et al., 2010]. However, the 
existing works in product design only explain the heterogeneity of consumer needs in 
limited ways. The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be identical [e.g., 
Orsborn et al., 2009], grouped into a small number of classes [e.g., Williams et al., 2008, 
2011], assumed to be random but having the same probability distribution [Shiau et al., 
2007], or considered heterogeneous by incorporating demographic information as 
explanatory variables in the consumer utility function [Hoyle et al., 2011]. The study by 
Koukova et al. [Koukova et al., 2008; Koukova et al., 2012] shows that consumers do 
react to product offerings differently when they are made aware of usage situations. Some 
consumers may even carry existing products together with the convergence product 
because the products outperform each other in different usage occasions [Kane, 2010]. A 
similar hierarchical Bayes model structure has been used in Yang et al. [Yang et al., 2002] 
where the authors study the consumers’ brand preferences for beverages under a variety 
of objective environment and subjective usage motivations, yet they do not address how 
the usage conditions influence the consumers’ evaluations of the products’ attributes.   
Finally, the proposed approach introduces a design metric called Convergence Index 
(CI) to help position the convergence product with respect to existing product markets 
and use the index to predict the potential market size. The CI metric is used to map 
engineering design variables to a numerical value which reflects how close the 
convergence product is to existing products in terms of product architectures, which has 
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implications for the demand of convergence product relative to the existing products. The 
literature on Commonality Index [e.g., Thevenot and Simpson, 2004; Kota et al., 2000] 
reveals similarity among product line variants. The commonality metrics mostly rely on 
counting the number of shared components among the variants in a product family or 
product line. Counting the number of shared components ignores the variation in 
component attributes and the rearrangement of the modular structure which collectively 
leads to new ways of performing the existing functionalities—a key reason that a 
convergence product differentiates from existing ones. On the other hand, market 
segmentation techniques [e.g., Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997] differentiate products using 
customer level attributes. Ramdas and Sawhney [Ramdas and Sawhney, 2001] measure 
the potential market size for a product line expansion by modeling the probabilities that 
consumers purchase the product given a variety of line expansion options. The proposed 
CI compares products by propagating the variations at different levels of modules 
through a product modular hierarchy, in creating a distance metric that quantifies the 
degree of similarity between the products as a function of their product architectures.  
Moreover, the proposed approach captures a product’s impact on the consumers’ 
usages using a logit model and considers a metric called Impact of Usage Evolution (IUE) 
to predict the effect on a product’s future market performance. The work in marketing 
research by Heilman et al. [Heilman et al., 2000] attributes the consumers’ evolving 
brand preferences to their cumulative purchase quantities of a specific brand. However, 
that work does not reveal the underlying product-consumer interaction process in which 
the consumers change preferences through using the products.  
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Section 3.2 gives the assumptions and problem definition. Section 3.3 presents the 
proposed framework and details of the methodology. Section 3.4 uses a case study for a 
tablet computer to demonstrate an application of the proposed methodology. Results for 
the case study are shown in Section 3.5 and highlights and concluding remarks are made 
in Section 3.6. 
3.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The problem is defined as follows. As shown in Figure 3.2, a manufacturing company 
plans to design a convergence product which integrates the functionalities offered in a set 
of existing categories of products, e.g., Product A and Product B. Functionality refers to a 
feature of usage from the consumers’ perspectives. For instance, a smartphone has the 
functionalities such as “sending emails”, “receiving phone calls” and “browsing the web”. 
The designer (or manager) is assumed to be able to identify the product categories a 
priori. A more detailed discussion of product categories or product markets can be found 
in the Lilien et al. [Lilien et al., 1995]. For instance, a product market can be defined by 
its title, such as “auto market” or “laptop market”; or can be defined from the customers’ 
perspective and consists of products that potentially replace each other, e.g., printers of 
different brands for home usage constitute the home printer category. 
The existing products, based on which the convergence product design is made, are 
assumed to be modular with their design solutions for the functionalities known. Here, a 
modular product refers to one that can be represented by a combination of physical and/or 
software units so that: (i) each unit has one or more functions and (ii) connections 
between the units are well defined [Ulrich, 2000]. The modules can be selected out of a 
“module library” which contains all candidate modules, with each module having a 
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variety of options to choose from. The design solution of a functionality is defined as the 
selection and specification of the modules which collectively enable that functionality. 
The designer can also consider a new functionality that none of the existing products 
provide. For a new functionality, it is assumed that a corresponding design solution is 
known a priori. On the demand side, it is presumed that the convergence product is 
targeted for heterogeneous consumers who will use at least one of the functionalities. The 
consumers use the functionalities in different usage situations and have diverse 
preferences for product attributes. The major cost of the product is incurred by 
purchasing its components or modules from the suppliers. 
  
Figure 3.2 Problem Definition 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the proposed approach begins by first constructing a modular 
representation of functionalities after investigating the structures of existing product 
categories that are intended to be merged into a convergence product. This leads to a 
modular hierarchical representation framework and a set of constraints which define the 
engineering design space for the convergence product. The process of developing the 
modular framework is detailed in Section 3.3.1. The design alternatives will be generated 
and selected using a Genetic Algorithm [Deb, 2001]. The design alternatives are first 












evaluated from the consumers’ perspective by using a hierarchical Bayes choice model. 
In this hierarchical model, the first level represents how the design attributes influence  
 
Figure 3.3 Design Decision Framework 
 
each consumer’s probability of choosing the product, and the second level reveals how 
the consumers’ usages of the functionalities influence their preferences. Section 3.3.2 
elaborates on the development of the hierarchical Bayes model. Meanwhile, two metrics 
are used to bridge the calculation of enterprise objectives such as profit. The first metric, 
Convergence Index, reveals how similar the convergent product is to existing products, 




































Evolution, evaluates the changes in a product’s market share when the consumers’ 
preferences change. The second metric takes into account the effect of product-customer 
interaction and indicates whether the market penetration of a design alternative is 
sustainable in the future. The two metrics are detailed in Section 3.3.4. The output of the 
first metric combined with the output of the first level of the choice model leads to the 
computation of the predicted demand. The cost model (Section 3.3.3) takes its inputs 
from both the design attributes and the predicted demand. The design alternatives will be 
selected by maximizing profit subject to the sustainability constraint in which IUE is 
confined to be non-negative. In this study, the price is kept fixed in order to separate the 
effect of changing design features on the profit. 
3.3.1 Modular Design Representation 
This section concerns the representation, generation and selection of engineering 
design alternatives.  
A module is defined to be a functional unit that directly supports a functionality. Each 
module can be further decomposed into sub-modules—physical or software units which 
facilitate their parent module. The modular hierarchy is constructed by decomposing the 
functionalities of existing products into modules/sub-modules in three levels as shown in 
Figure 4. The top level, Functionality Level, contains all the functionalities that the 
products in the existing categories have. The Module Level includes all the modules that 
support at least one of the functionalities in the top level. The Sub-module Level consists 




Figure 3.4 Modular Hierarchy Framework 
Design Alternative Representation. A vector F=(Fi)1×f is used to denote the 
inclusion of f functionalities, with each entry Fi set to 1 when the corresponding 
functionality i is present in a design alternative. A binary string M=(Mi)1×n can be used to 
indicate the availability of n modules (e.g., n=8 in Figure 3.4), with each entry Mi set to 1 
when the module i is present in a design alternative. The availability of sub-modules is 
denoted using SM. Each entry of SM, or SMij, is a binary variable denoting the inclusion 
of the j’th sub-module in module i. Additionally, a vector zij is defined to represent the 
attributes of sub-module j of module i. The entries of zij can take numerical values (e.g., 
the diagonal size of “SM71: LCD Panel” in Figure 4) as well as nominal values (e.g., the 
material type of “SM61: Battery” in Figure 4). In summary, a design alternative is 
represented by the collection x = {F, M, SM, z}. 
Functional Enabling Constraint. A functionality is enabled when all its required 
modules are present in a design alternative. An Enabling Matrix, denoted by 
EM=(EMij)f×n, is defined with EMij =1 if implementing function i requires module j and 
EMij =0 otherwise. The matrix EM can be determined by analyzing the modular 






















































design alternative to be feasible is that all the selected functionalities are enabled, which 
can be formulated as (the prime symbol is for transposition): 
FMEM   nnf 1'  (3.1) 
Module Composition Constraint. When a module is selected in the convergence 
product, its sub-modules need to be selected such that the same composition can be found 
in at least one of the existing products. A necessary condition for a design alternative to 
be feasible can be stated as: 
   .,,...,2,1,1|:,...,1 , xSSniMiiKk ikii   (3.2) 
with k=1,…,K indexing all the existing products. 
Sub-module Feasibility Constraint. The attributes of sub-modules are constrained 
by lower/upper bounds (for numerical values) and set of options (for nominal values). 
Zz is used to represent the feasible region for all the zi,j.  
The engineering design space is therefore bounded by the above mentioned 
constraints: (i) Functional Enabling Constraint; (ii) Module Composition Constraints, and 
(iii) Sub-module Feasibility Constraint.  
Design Alternative Generation and Selection. A Genetic Algorithm is used to 
generate and select design alternatives. The design alternatives are first translated into bit 
strings. The fitness function is aligned with profit and is maximized. The overall design 
optimization problem will be presented in Section 3.3.5. 
3.3.2 Modeling Consumer Choice for Convergence Products: A Hierarchical Bayes 
Model 
In this section, the demand for a design alternative x is evaluated.  
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Explaining Consumer Heterogeneity: Product Usage Conditions. Usage situations 
can drive a consumer’s preference for the product attributes. Belk (1975) proposed a 
number of variables that could characterize usage situations. In this chapter, the 
categorizations in Belk’s study are adapted and denote the usage conditions of 







, situation). The element      ξf 
i
frequency represents the usage frequency for 
functionality f. The element ξf 
i
,access represents a consumer’s need to get instant access to 
a certain functionality. The last element ξf 
i
,situation denotes if a consumer considers 
himself/herself to use the product under a series of usage situations, for instance, 
searching, shopping or social networking for the functionality of “web browsing”.  
Hierarchical Bayes Choice Model. A two level model to represent consumers’ 
choices is proposed. In the first level, a Multinomial Logit Model [McFadden, 1980] is 





















Pr  (3.3) 
in which: 
jijiU Xβ ',   (3.4) 
The no-choice utility UNC is set to 0 for the purpose of identification. The term Ui,k 
denotes the utility for every competing convergence product. Eqn. (3.3) is simplified 
when only one convergence product is in the market. In this case, the consumers will 
choose between buying and not buying the product. 
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The second level model explains how the vector βi is different for each consumer. A 
multivariate linear model is used to relate the usage conditions of consumer i to his/her 
preference: 
    εξξξτβββ  IiIi ,...,,...,,...,,..., 11  (3.5) 
The coefficients to be estimated in Eqn. (3.4) and Eqn. (3.5) are: βi, τ. In the context 
of Bayesian statistics, the coefficients are taken as random variables. The designer 
postulates the prior distributions, updates the prior using consumer choice data, and 
obtains the posterior distributions for the coefficients. The data can be obtained using 
conjoint surveys [Green and Srinivasan, 1978].  
Following the model structure proposed by Rossi et al. [Rossi et al., 2005], the 
hierarchical Bayes model is formulated as the following for Likelihood: 









,Pr|, βXy  (3.6.1) 
Priors: 
    εξξξτβββ  IiIi ,...,,...,,...,,..., 11  (3.6.2) 
 V0ε ,~ Ni  (3.6.3) 
    1,~| AVτVτ  vecNvec  (3.6.4) 
 00,~ VvV IW  (3.6.5) 
Posterior: 
       εεξετξββXyξXyετβ pppLp  |,,|)|,(,,|,,  (3.6.6) 
The diffuse prior distributions are specified to diminish the influence of bias in the 
prior distributions. For instance, the means of priors were set to 0 and a matrix 100I (I 
denotes identity matrix) is used as the variance matrix. In this way, the probability 
density profiles of the prior distributions are flat so that no significant favor is given to 
any particular value. In the formulation of priors, “N” denotes multivariate normal 
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distribution and “IW” denotes inverse wishart distribution. In Eqn. (3.6.4) the symbol “” 
refers to tensor product; the term “vec” denotes matrix vectorization. 
Since the posterior distributions are usually not in closed forms, the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation can be applied to draw samples from the posterior. The 
output of MCMC is a chain of samples for all the coefficients: βi
c, τc, with c=1,2,…,C  
indexing the samples in the chain. Considering the fact that a convergence product will 
be the only option in the new category, the choice that a consumer makes is between to 
purchase or not to purchase.  
Given the estimate of parameters βi
c, the expected demand for a design alternative 
with attributes X* can be formulated: 


















X  (3.7) 
The formulation of market size Nc will be elaborated in Section 3.4.1. 
3.3.3 Cost Model 
Under a modular product structure, the production cost can be approximated by the 
summation of the component costs and the assembly cost. Previous literature [Simpson 
and Park, 2005] points out that the manufacturing cost is not only a function of product 
designs but also relates to the quantity produced. This study accounted for the fact that (i) 
the selection of components is dictated by the design specifications and (ii) the unit cost 
of each component can be related to the order quantities. There are different ways to 
explain the discounting effect when the quantity goes up. One way of interpreting it is 
through the economy of scale argument in which increased quantity is considered to 
lower the cost per unit produced. Another explanation is the learning curve effect which 
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models the fact that the manufacturing cost drops down gradually when the production 
process iterates. Additionally, the suppliers do offer discounts when the order quantity is 
large. 
In general, it is assumed that some components exhibit the discounting effect whereas 
others are purchased at a constant unit cost. For the components whose cost relates to the 
quantities, the unit cost, denoted by K, is formulated following the specifications of 
learning curves: 
  bQKQK  1  (3.8) 
Taking the log of both sides, a log–linear cost function in b is obtained: 
  QbKQK logloglog 1   (3.9) 
Inserting relevant attribute of the component Xm, for instance, the diagonal size for the 
LCD display, the above formulation is extended to: 
  mm XbQbKXQK logloglog,log 211   (3.10) 
The above formulation can be estimated by collecting price quotes from component 
suppliers. A linear regression procedure will be used to obtain the coefficient b1 and b2. 
The above formulation can also be extended when a component is characterized by two 
or more attributes. 
The total cost is formulated as the summation of the costs for all the components plus 
the assembly cost: 


















i KXQKKQK XX  (3.11) 
in which i=1,…,I1 denotes the set of components whose unit costs are discountable; 
i=I1,…,I2 denotes the components whose unit costs are constant. K0(X) denotes the 
assembly cost.  
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3.3.4 Design Metrics 
In this section, two design metrics are proposed, Convergence Index and Impact of 
Usage Evolution, to support the evaluation of fitness for a design alternative x. 
A preliminary step to developing the metrics is to define the average product for each 
existing product category. It is assumed that all the competing products in each existing 
category can be identified a priori. The average product is a hypothetical product offering 
that averages the customer observed attributes of all the competing products in a given 
product category.  
Convergence Index (CI) and Market Size. CI serves the purpose of comparing the 
similarity between the convergence product and the existing products. The computation 
of CI is carried out in four steps: 
Step 1:  Compute Di which is the difference in design between the convergence 












Step 2: Compute Di,j which reflects how the two products provide the same 


































Eqn (3.13) primarily means the following: when functionality j is available in only 
one of the products being compared, the difference Di,j is set to 1 which is the largest 
possible value of the difference. When none of the products implement the functionality j, 
the difference decreases to the smallest value 0. Otherwise, Di,j sums over the difference 
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with respect to each module that enables functionality j as reflected by di,j,m (to be 
computed in Step 3).  























d  (3.14) 
The value of di,j,m is normalized between 0 and 1. The term 
i
smsm zz   measures the 
difference with respect to the sub-module sm of module m. When a sub-module sm is 
















































That is, when zsm takes nominal values (i.e., as opposed to numerical values 
i
smsm zz   
is set to 0 if the values zsm and zsm
i are the same; otherwise it is set to 1. When zsm takes 
numerical values, 
i
smsm zz   can be taken as the distance between vectors zsm and zsmi.  
Step 4: Compute CI based the formulations from Eqn. (3.12) to Eqn. (3.15): 
ii DCI 1  (3.16) 
Consider a simple example of computing the convergence index for a tablet computer 
and a laptop. It is first demonstrated how the two products can be compared regarding the 
functionality of reading e-books. Assume that the functionality is enabled by (i) a storage 
module (M1) with one sub-module flash memory (SM11), and (ii) a display module (M2) 
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with one sub-module LCD panel (SM21). The size of the flash memory is denoted by a 
discrete variable z11 taking values such as 8GB, 16GB, etc. The diagonal dimension, in 
inches, of the LCD panel is denoted by a continuous variable z21 taking positive real 
values between 0 and 20. The tablet computer can be represented by {z11=16GB, z21=11} 
and the laptop can be represented by {z11=120GB, z21=15}. Comparing the storage 




















































The above procedure can be carried out for other functionalities such as web 
browsing. Averaging the comparison for all the functionalities using Eqn. (3.12) yields 
DLaptop. Eventually, the convergence index is computed using Eqn. (3.16). 
The convergence index is then used to estimate the potential market size. The market 
size formulation only predicts the number of consumers who will potentially buy the 
convergence product. Whether the consumer will consider the convergence product as a 
complement or substitute to the existing product(s) will depend on his/her usage 
situations and unique preferences reflected by the hierarchical Bayes model in Eqn. (3.6). 
Consider a simple case of converging 2 existing product categories A and B, each with 
the market size of NA and NB. The overlap of the two markets (or number of consumers 
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who purchases both product A and product B) is denoted by NAB. As a result, the 
estimated market size of a convergence product can be formulated as: 
    ABBABBBBAABAAAC NONNCIONNCIN   (3.20) 
The above formulation can be generalized when three or more existing product 
categories are considered. 
Impact of Usage Evolution (IUE). The product-consumer interaction is 
characterized by two stages. In the first stage, the purchase stage, a consumer makes a 
choice given his/her current preferences. In the second stage, the usage stage, the 
consumer starts using the new product and gradually adjusts his/her usage conditions. 
While the first stage happens at the time of purchasing, the second stage takes place over 
the longer time periods after the consumer buys and uses a product. The two stages are 
assumed to be independent. A separate model will be developed in the following to 
represent the effects in the second stage. 
Specifically, the designer needs to consider how a product x may gradually change a 
consumer’s usages ξi which eventually determines his/her preferences βi for the 
forthcoming purchase occasions.  
The usage condition for consumer i is considered to have an inherent component ξi
0 
specific to this consumer and a variable component ξi
1 that results from using the 
products: 
 10 , iii ξξξ   (3.21) 
In practice, the data on consumer’s usage is usually observed as an ordinal measure. 
For instance, a consumer may claim his/her frequency of checking emails to be “every 1 
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hour”, “every 2 hours” or “every 3 hours”, rather than reporting continuous quantities. 
The term “latent satisfaction” is used to represent the underlying motive that consumer i 
chooses a specific level l for using functionality f. The latent satisfaction is modeled as 
the averaged effect of using all the products that a consumer currently owns, with the 
























  (3.22) 
in which P is the total number of products owned by consumer i. 
The consumers are assumed to adapt their future usage levels such that their 
satisfactions are maximized. The Multinomial Logit Model formulation is used to capture 
this situation. Specifically, the probability that consumer i is observed to choose usage 
level l for functionality f is formulated as: 








































,, Xγ  (3.23.2) 
The model can be estimated using a Bayesian multinomial logit regression procedure 
[Rossi et al., 2005]. The coefficients to be estimated are i lf ,γ vectors which are of the 
63 
 
same length as product attribute vectors Xi
n. The log likelihood of the model is shown 
below: 
      






















































Now it is discussed how the above model helps a designer to infer the changes in 
consumers’ preferences. For every design alternative with attribute X, the designer will 
be able to predict the consumers’ future usage frequencies (or levels) conditional on their 
purchase of the convergence product: 




































 ξξξ  
(3.25.1
) 



















,, Xγ  
(3.25.2
) 
The designer takes *ifξ  as the prediction of the consumers’ evolved usage conditions 
until the next purchase occasion. The future preferences of consumers are obtained using 
the second level of the hierarchical Bayes choice model shown in Eqn. (3.5). That is: 
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** ii ξτβ   (3.26) 
In addition to considering the profit, the designer needs to guarantee that the newly 
designed product will not lead the consumers to change their usages in a way such that 
their probability of buying the product in the future decreases. In other words, the 
expected market penetration in the future should not decrease. The IUE metric is 
therefore formulated as the difference between the current market penetration and the 
expected future market penetration. Specifically,  
















































in which c=1,…,C denotes a chain of samples obtained using the Bayesian estimation for 
the hierarchical Bayes choice model; Prob0 denotes the current market share; Prob1 
denotes the expected future market share. The metric IUE will be constrained to be non-
negative in the selection of design alternatives.  
3.3.5. The Design Optimization Problem 
Assuming that the company is only marketing the convergence product, the profit 
function is formulated as: 
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      XXx QQKpp P ,;  (3.28) 
in which p denotes the price, K(Q, X) denotes cost as defined in Eqn. (3.11) and Q(X) 
denotes demand as defined in Eqn. (3.7). 



















in which gi(x) denotes the inequality constraint functions  such as engineering constraints 
as well as long term market penetration consideration IUE≥0; hj(x) denotes equality 
constraint functions such as Functional Enabling Constraint represented by Eqn. (3.1). 
The above design optimization problem is solved using a Genetic Algorithm [e.g., 
Williams et al., 2008; Khajavirad et al., 2009]. In this study, the Matlab’s Global 
Optimization Toolbox [MathWorks, 2011] is used to implement the genetic algorithm. 
3.4 CASE STUDY 
A consumer electronics company is interested in developing a convergence product 
based on two of its existing categories: laptop and smartphone. Among the functionalities 
that the existing products have, the following are being considered: (i) 
reading/sending/receiving emails; (ii) web browsing; (iii) playing multimedia contents, 
and (iv) reading e-books. It is assumed that the existing products are mature categories 
whose product and market structures are well known. The annual market sizes of the 
existing categories Laptop (category A) and Smartphone (category B) are assumed to be: 
66 
 
NA=17.9M (units) and NB=28M (units) [Mintel Oxygen, 2008; Mintel Oxygen, 2010]. 
Using the data collected in the survey (to be elaborated in Section 4.3), the percentages of 
overlap in the two markets (percentages of consumers in each market who purchase both 
products) are: OAB,A =57.7% and OAB,B=95.3%. The designer’s objective is to find the 
optimal design which maximizes the company’s profit by considering a sustainable future 
market penetration. 
The engineering design model for this example is formulated in Section 3.4.1. Section 
3.4.2 presents the computation of customer observed product attributes as functions of 
engineering design variables. Section 3.4.3 describes the procedure for collecting 
customer preference data. The production cost is modeled in Section 3.4.4. Finally, three 
different design scenarios for comparison are formulated in Section 3.4.5. 
3.4.1. Engineering Design Model 
The first step of designing the convergence product is to construct a modular 
hierarchy for it by investigating how existing categories implement the functionalities. It 
is assumed that an average product can be defined for each category. Figure 3.4 presents 
the modular hierarchy of the product architectures of the two existing product categories. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the design variables and number of bits for each variable when 
translated into a bit string.  
 Some design variables take binary values of 1 or 0, e.g., x1 indicates if function 
“email” is available or not in a design alternative. Some design variables take nominal 
values, e.g., x25 represents the discrete options of memory size such as 8GB, 16GB, 32GB 
and 64GB. The rest of the variables take continuous values, e.g., x31 represents the  
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x1 F1 0 1 1 1 
x2 F2 0 1 1 1 
x3 F3 0 1 1 1 
x4 F4 0 1 1 0 
x5 M1 0 1 1 0 
x6 M2 0 1 0 1 
x7 M3 0 1 1 1 
x8 M4 0 1 1 1 
x9 M5 0 1 1 1 
x10 M6 0 1 1 1 
x11 M7 0 1 1 1 
x12 M8 0 1 1 1 
x13 SM11 0 1 1 0 
x14 SM21 0 1 0 1 
x15 SM22 0 1 0 1 
x16 SM31 0 1 1 1 
x17 SM32 0 1 1 0 
x18 SM41 0 1 1 1 
x19 SM51 0 1 1 1 
x20 SM52 0 1 0 1 
x21 SM61 0 1 1 1 
x22 SM71 0 1 1 1 





























x28 z61,2  
(Battery diagonal) 
1'' 11'' 14'' 3.5'' 
x29 z61,3 
(Battery depth) 
0.1'' 1'' 0.5'' 0.1'' 
x30 z71,1 
(LCD Type) 
SD HD HD SD 
x31 z71,2 
(LCD Diagonal) 
3'' 12'' 14'' 3.1'' 
x32 z71,3 
(LCD Ratio) 
4:3 16:9 16:9 4:3 
 
diagonal length of the LCD panel. The last two columns of Table 3.1 show the design 
alternatives corresponding to the average products in the two existing categories.  
Meanwhile, the functional enabling matrix EM is shown in Figure 3.5. As shown in 
Figure 3.5, each entry of the matrix EMij, indicates if functionality i requires module j. 
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For instance, for functionality F4 of “Reading E-books” and module M7 of “Display”, the 
corresponding entry EMij will be set to 1 since reading e-books requires a display module.  
 
Figure 3.5  Functional Enabling Matrix 
 
3.4.2. Mapping of Engineering Design to Product Attributes Observed by 
Consumers  
The engineering design variables need to be translated into attributes that consumers 
observe when making a purchase decision. Such attributes may include size, weight and 
other features of a product. In this study, 13 product attributes are selected to represent a 
convergence product. Table 3.2 enlists all of the attributes and elaborates on how they are 
obtained by a mapping from the engineering design space. Some of the models and 
parameters are obtained from the literature [Haskell, 2004]. Other parameters can be 
obtained from the electronic component distributors’ websites [e.g., Mouser Electronics, 






















0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
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Table 3.2 Customer Level Attributes and Formulations 
1 Email: X1=x1   , 
2 Web Browsing: X2=x2  , 
3 Media Player: X3=x3  , 
4 E-book Reader: X4=x4  , 
5 Product size (Product enclosure size measured by the product’s diagonal in inches): X5=x5 
sizekeyboard +(1-x5)  sizetouch   , 
sizekeyboard=1.4 x31  ,      sizetouch=max{x31,x28} 
6 Product depth (Summation of LCD display thickness, enclosure thickness and the battery 
thickness. The first two dimensions are assumed to be constant): X6= tLCD +tpackaging +tBattery   , 
tLCD=1 ( inch) ,     tpackaging=0.5 ( inch),   tBattery=x29 (inch)  , 
7 Product weight (Summation of the weights of all its components in lbs): X7= wcircuit+ whard 
drive+ wkeyboard+ wpackaging+ wbattery  , 
wcircuit=0.5 (lbs ),   whard drive=1 ( lbs ),   wkeyboard=0.5 ( lbs)  , 
wpackaging=0.5 (lbs),   ρbattery,ni-ion=0.0863 (lbs/inch
3)  , 
ρbattery,ni-polymer=0.038 (lbs/inch
3),  ρLCD=0.3 (lbs/inch)  , 
wbattery = I(x27=1) ρbattery,ni-ion x28x29+ I(x27=2) ρbattery,ni-polymer x28x29  , 
8 Battery life  
(The battery life is obtained by dividing the battery capacity by the total power consumption. 
The battery capacity depends on the battery material and its power density. The power 
consumption sums over the power consumption of every module, e.g., CPU, Display, Memory 
and etc.):  





2ρpower,ni-polymer  , 
Power= pcpu+ pLCD+ pMemory+ pWireless   , 
ρpower,ni-ion=120  (w hr/L),   ρpower,ni-polymer=240  (w hr/L )  , 
ρpower,LCD=0.29 (w/inch
3),   pcpu=2.5 I(x24=1)+30 I(x24=2)  , 
pLCD=0.48 x31
2 ρpower,LCD ,    pMemory= I(x26=1)+2 I(x26=1)  , 
pWireless =2 x19+1.5 x20  , 
9 Input Module: X9=x5+2x6  , 
10 Wireless Type: X10= x19+2x20  , 
11 Display Type: X11=x30  , 
12 Memory Size: X12=x25  , 
13 Price: X13=$500  . 
 
3.4.3. Collecting Customer Preferences 
The customer preference information is collected using a choice-based conjoint 
survey. The survey consists of three sections: (i) usage condition questions; (ii) 12 choice 
tasks each having three alternatives, and (iii) the existing products the respondent already 
own and their prices.  
Survey Design. The challenge of designing the conjoint survey for a convergence 
product is the large number of attributes. For instance, given a total number of 13 
attributes with each attributes having 3 levels, there are 313 (or 1,594,323) possible 
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product profiles that need to be evaluated by respondents. In this study, the randomized 
design scheme suggested by Sawtooth Software CBC Module [Sawtooth, 2001] is 
adopted. Discussions regarding the efficiency of the design scheme is given by Sawtooth 
[Sawtooth, 2001]. The design scheme is also reviewed by Chrzan and Orme [Chrzan and 
Orme, 2000].  
Survey Distribution and Data Collection. Qualtrics software [Qualtrics, 2010] was 
utilized for online survey interface development, survey distribution and data collection. 
The experimental design was exported into a spreadsheet which the Qualtrics software 
integrates into the web-based surveys. The online distribution was operated through the 
server in Netcentric Behavioral Laboratory in the R. H. Smith School of Business, 
University of Maryland, College Park. The survey was sent to 475 candidate respondents 
out of which a total of 125 responses were collected. After eliminating unusable 
responses, e.g., those with skipped questions, 92 out of the 125 responses were used to 
estimate the model parameters. 
3.4.4. Cost Model Specifications 
The product cost model parameters are obtained from online price quotations of 
electronic component distributors [e.g., Mouser, 2011]. The details of the cost model are 
presented in Table 3.3. For simplicity, the assembly cost is set to 0. 
Table 3.3 Cost Modeling 
Item Cost 
LCD Display 
β1=-0.1032,   β2=0.7965, C0,LCD=50 ($),  




Cbattery,ni-ion=1 $/(w hr),  Cbattery,ni-polymer=2 $/(w hr) 
Cbattery=x21 (I(x27=1) Cbattery,ni-ion+ I(x27=2)Cbattery,ni-ion) 
Memory Cost 
Cflash,0=4 ($/GB), Chard drive,0=0.07 ($/GB) 
Cmemory= x25 (I(x26=1) Cbattery,ni-ion+ I(x26=2)Cbattery,ni-ion) 
Integrated 
Circuits 
Ccpu=18.5 ($), Cgpu=6.5 ($), Cwifi=19 ($), C3G=19 ($) 
Cother=37 ($) 
Miscellaneous Ckeyboard=2 ($), Cspeaker=2 ($), Cenclosure=12 ($) 
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3.4.5. Scenario Development 
Three scenarios for the case study were considered, as shown in Table 3.4. In each 
scenario a different design optimization problem is solved.  
Table 3.4 Case Study Scenarios 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Optimal Profit    
Heterogeneity    
Impact of Usage Evolution    
 
Scenario 1: In this scenario, it is assumed that consumer preferences are 
homogeneous. That is, a single vector β is used to represent the preference of every 
consumer. This is variation to the model presented in Eqns. (3.3) and (3.4) as a 
benchmark. A design selection is therefore made to satisfy an average consumer. 
Meanwhile, the model has only one hierarchy, that is, the impact of usage conditions on 
the consumers’ preferences is ignored. This scenario serves as a benchmark to compare 
the difference in design solutions with and without consumer heterogeneity 
considerations. 
Scenario 2: The second scenario considers heterogeneous consumer preferences. That 
is, the full model presented in Section 3.3.2 is used to represent the consumers’ choice 
behaviors. The designer optimizes profit but ignores the fact that consumers preferences 
can change over time as they use the convergence product. In this way, the design 
decision is made in favor of current profit without considering the product’s future 
market penetrations.  
Scenario 3: The last scenario extends the decision in Scenario 2 by accounting for the 
impact of usage evolutions or IUE. The design optimization problem is to find the 
optimal design for the convergence product for maximum profit while ensuring that the 
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future market penetration of the product will not decrease due to the changes in the 
consumers’ preferences. 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1. Estimations of Consumer Choice Models for Three Scenarios 
The hierarchical Bayes model was estimated using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
sampling procedure. The procedure introduced by Rossi et al. [Rossi et al., 2005] was 
adapted to obtain the samples for the posterior distributions. The diffuse prior 
distributions were specified to diminish the influence of bias in the prior distributions. 
For instance, the means of priors were set equal to 0 and used 100I as the variance matrix. 
In the case study, the sampling algorithm was run for 20,000 steps and the last 3,000 
samples were used to represent the posterior distributions. Due to the stochastic nature of 
the sampling procedure, the algorithm had to be run multiple times to check the 
consistency of the sample mean of the posterior distributions. More details regarding the 
method to assess such results, e.g., convergence of the chain and robustness of the 
posterior, are discussed by Gill [Gill, 2008]. 
For Scenario 1, interestingly, a homogenous preference model is assumed (using one 
vector to represent the preferences of all the consumers) but a bi-model posterior 
distribution is observed. For instance, the part-worth corresponding to the feature “Email” 
appears to be a mixture of two normal distributions with different mean values. Such 
contradiction reveals that the preferences of the consumers are indeed heterogeneous. 
In Scenarios 2 and 3, the consumer preferences are estimated using the full model in 
Eqn. (3.6). That is, each consumer has a unique vector representing his/her preferences 
and the preference is related to the consumer’s usage of the functionalities. 
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The significance of the estimation results can be revealed by computing Deviance 
Information Criterion (DIC) suggested by Spiegelhalter et al. [Spiegelhalter et al., 2002]. 
DIC is a popular measurement in the Bayesian statistics as an alternative for Hypothesis 
testing. Generally, a model with better goodness of fit can be associated with a smaller 
DIC value. The estimation result yields DIC=2407.7. Meanwhile, the model 
corresponding to the null hypothesis (i.e., setting β=0) yields DIC0=3060.9. The 
noticeable difference between DIC and DIC0 supports the significance of the estimation. 
It also demonstrates that the sample size of the data collected in the survey is sufficient to 
lead to a meaningful result. 
3.5.2. Estimation of Consumer Usage Evolutions 
In the third scenario, the optimal design decision will be made subject to an additional 
constraint that future market penetration of the convergence product should be non-
decreasing. To enforce this constraint, the model discussed in Section 3.3.4 will be 
estimated first. The data include how the consumers are using the relevant functionalities 
now and what products they have purchased. In the online survey, a variety of questions 
were asked regarding usage conditions and at the end asked about their ownership of 
products such as laptops and smartphones. The prices of the products were collected as 
well.  
It is assumed that the variable component of a consumer’s usage is the frequency of 
using the functionalities. For instance, a consumer can adjust how often he/she reads e-
books. This assumption is for simplicity so as to make the size of the regression problem 
manageable. Additionally, the attributes of the products that a consumer already owns are 
inferred using their responses for the prices of the products. The information about the 
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attributes and prices of typical products in the marketplace are collected by visiting the 
websites of major manufacturers and retailers. The attributes of the typical products for 
the laptop and smartphone categories are presented in Table 3.5 (for the prices of 
smartphones showed the price for unlocked versions without service contracts). For a 
product that is not listed, the attributes were estimated using a linear interpolation based 
on price.  
Table 3.5 Typical Products in Laptop and Smartphone Markets 
 Laptops Smartphones 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Price $450 $800 $1.2k $359 $400 $599 
Email 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Web 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Media 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ebook 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Size 10.1'' 15.6'' 13.3'' 4.8'' 3.5'' 4.8'' 
Depth 1.3'' 1.3'' 0.95'' 0.55'' 0.6'' 0.56'' 
Weight 3'' 6.51'' 4.5'' 0.22'' 0.3'' 0.25'' 
Battery 9.5 hrs 9 hrs 10 hrs 4.5 hrs 6 hrs 6 hrs 











Display HD HD HD SD SD SD 
Memory 250GB 500GB 250GB 0.25GB 16GB 1GB 
 
Using the data collected in the survey one is able to estimate the coefficient in the 
model of usage evolution or the γ matrix in Eqn. (3.23). For any given design alternative 
x with attributes X, a consumer’s future usage conditions (or *ifξ ) are obtained using the 
procedures proposed in Eqn. (3.25). The updated usage conditions eventually lead to a 
mismatch between the present and forthcoming purchase decisions of the same consumer 
and IUE can be computed using Eqn. (3.27). 
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3.5.3. Solutions and Discussion  
The attributes of the optimal design solutions for the three scenarios are compared in 
Figure 6. The results are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
Scenario 1: Effect of CI. In Scenario 1, the optimal design is a hand-held electronic 
device with relatively small size and light weight, and is capable of sending/receiving 
emails, browsing the web and reading e-books. It is worth noting that the convergence 
index with respect to laptops is above 0.6 whereas for smartphones it is about 0.2, which 
is counterintuitive since the hand-held device seems to be closer to a smartphone in terms 
of size and weight. This effect is explained by looking at how the convergence indices are 
computed. The CI metric considers not only a number of customer observed attributes but 
also the engineering designs for each functionality. The selection of the modules for each 
functionality turns out to be much closer to that in a laptop and therefore results in a 
larger value of convergence index to laptops. In this scenario, the consumer choice model 
is a single level model which assumes the usages of functionalities have not influence on 
the consumers’ preferences. As a result, the metric IUE is not computed.  
Scenario 2: Effect of Consumer Heterogeneity. In the second scenario, the 
consumers are considered as heterogeneous and the heterogeneity is due to their different 
ways of using the functionalities. The optimal design differs significantly from that in 
Scenario 1. A tablet size device was obtained which can only be used for media playing 
and e-book reading. The device therefore lacks wireless communication. The expected 
profit has improved from $8,092.8M in Scenario 1 to $8,624.9M, though the unit cost 
also increases from $114.4 to $135. The device operates with fewer functionalities (2 
functionalities in Scenario 2 versus 3 in Scenario 1) but incurs higher cost, which reflects 
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the designers intention to concentrate on a small number of functionalities but deliver 
higher satisfaction to the consumers for each functionality (e.g., providing consumers a 
larger screen to watch videos and read e-books). The sustainability of market penetration 
is ignored in this scenario. That is, the designer only considers short term profitability 
while ignores how consumers will change their preferences. As a result, a negative IUE 
of -0.9% was obtained. In other words, the future market penetration of the optimal 
design will decrease. 
Scenario 3: Effect of IUE. In Scenario 3 the designer extends the design 
optimization problem in Scenario 2 for a sustainable market penetration. The 
functionalities of the optimal design in this scenario include email, web and e-book. 
Another difference in comparing to the design in Scenario 2 is the inclusion of keyboard 
as another input module. The rearrangement of the functionalities results in an increase of 
unit production cost from $135 to $149.3 and the short term profit drops from $8,624.9M 
to $8,013.5M. The decrease in short term profit is justified by a positive IUE value of 
0.32% which indicates an increase of the market penetration in the long run. From an 
optimization perspective, considering a sustainable market penetration imposes an 
additional constraint to the design decision problem and shrinks the feasible region. As a 
result, the maximum profit cannot be as high as that in a less constrained problem. In 
terms of convergence indices, the optimal design resides in a place between the optimal 
designs in the previous scenarios. The distinction is due to consumer heterogeneity as 
well as sustainability of future market penetration.  
It is worth noting that the attribute values of “battery life” of the three designs are 
very small. Although these values do not violate engineering feasibility constraints, they 
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contradict the product attributes observed in the real world market. In the conjoint survey, 
the attribute levels of “battery life” are presented at “2 hours”, “6 hours” and “10 hours”. 
The partworths for “battery life” at other values are obtained using a linear interpolation 
method. In other words, the customer survey does not accurately capture the consumers’ 
responses for battery life values smaller than 2 hours. One way of correcting this is to add 
more attribute levels into the conjoint survey in order to obtain a more accurate 
measurement of the consumers’ responses. Another solution is to impose a constraint on 
the attribute “battery life”, for instance, an inequality constraint which screens out the 
design alternatives with battery life values smaller than, say, 2 hours. The above three 
scenarios each represents a different design decision problem. Therefore, it may not be 
legitimate to make a choice among the three optimal design solutions. The designer needs 
to identify the appropriate scenario based on the market trend then derive the optimal 
solution as the design decision. For instance, if the technology forecasts indicate that the 
market might change very fast (that is, new developments are imminent which might lead 
to paradigm shifts) then the designer might as well take a short term approach to 
maximize profit and not consider IUE as in Scenario 3. There is no right or wrong 
scenario between 2 and 3, it is just the question of which scenario meshes well with 




Figure 3.6 Comparison of Optimal Designs 
3.6 SUMMARY 
In this research thrust, a design decision framework is proposed for designing 
convergence products. A modular design framework is developed to integrate design 
solutions from multiple existing product categories and handle the couplings of 
functionalities for the convergence product, a problem that has not been addressed in 
extant literature but is an important one given the proliferation of convergence products. 
There are two important distinctions vis-à-vis prior work in that the proposed approach (1) 
accounts for the heterogeneous consumer choice behaviors by using a hierarchical Bayes 
model with its second level relating the consumers’ preferences to their diverse ways of 
using the functionalities, and (2) considers two design metrics, Convergence Index (CI) 














































































and Impact of Usage Evolution (IUE) to assist the designer’s profit maximization 
decision. CI predicts the potential market size for the convergence product by measuring 
its similarity to existing product categories; IUE considers the changes in consumer usage 
conditions and their preferences in the forthcoming purchase occasions and predicts how 
such adaptation influences future market penetration. An optimal design is obtained to 
maximize the company’s profit while considering a sustainable future market penetration. 
In this chapter, the feasibility of combining modules from different product categories 
is implicitly assumed. For instance, the design method does not account for the fact that 
combining the “processor” of a smartphone and the “memory” of a laptop may not be 
necessarily feasible. In general, the capability of two (or more) systems to work together 
particularly under uncertainty can be challenging to analyze. The next chapter will 
mathematically model such capabilities of coupled systems. Additionally, both upstream 
market system (i.e., suppliers) and downstream market system (i.e., service providers) 







CHAPTER 4: DESIGN FOR UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM MARKET 
SYSTEMS WITH INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
The economic globalization and emerging high tech markets are pushing product 
design decision makers to account for both upstream and downstream market systems. 
Sourcing different components, modules, assemblies (or subsystems) of a product from a 
variety of domestic and overseas suppliers is becoming increasingly common. Consumer 
electronics companies such as Apple, Dell and others outsource the majority (if not all) of 
the components they need from their suppliers. Such practice has also been prevalent in 
other industries such as automobiles for decades. In this context, the specification of each 
module and the coupling or interoperability among different modules has become 
critically important particularly when the manufacturer does not have full control over its 
supply chain. Moreover, the product designer is often challenged to account for the 
interoperability by determining how well the sourced modules can work with each other 
under uncertainty. One example of such uncertainty can be the variations of usage 
conditions: using a cordless power tool to drill a piece of wood versus a piece of metal 
incurs different levels of loading on the motor, which in turn propagates through the 
couplings among the subsystems such as the transmission (gears) and battery.  
Additionally, emerging high tech product markets are becoming increasingly 
connected to the service sector. Many consumer products, for instance, smartphones and 
tablet computers, rely on a variety of service providers to deliver their functions. 
Selecting service providers to partner in order to achieve the product’s functionalities to 
the fullest extent possible has become a critical task for product designers.  
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With a focus on interoperability, this chapter aims at a design selection framework 
which accounts for both upstream market system (i.e., suppliers) and downstream market 
system (i.e., service providers and customers) to devise and explore: (i) a modeling 
approach that can be used for analysis of interoperability among subsystems of a product, 
(ii) a modeling approach that accounts for the couplings between the product design 
decisions and the offerings of service providers, and (iii) an integration of design 
decisions with respect to both upstream and downstream market systems. 
The chapter is organized as following. Section 4.1 reviews the related research and 
positions the proposed method against the previous works. Section 4.2 defines the 
terminologies and describes the problem definition. Section 4.3 discusses the proposed 
method. Section 4.4 presents two case studies, namely, design selection of a cordless 
angle grinder where only upstream interoperability is considered and the design selection 
for a tablet computer where both upstream and downstream interoperability are 
considered. Conclusions are provided in Section 4.5.  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter extends the existing research along three directions as discussed in the 
following.  
I. Proposing a mathematical model of interoperability.  
A major challenge in design selection with a supply chain based market is to manage 
the couplings among the modules so that each module can operate well in concert with 
other modules. Examples of methods that handle couplings are reported in a different 
context, as in Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO), e.g., Analytic Target 
Cascading method [Kim, 2001] and Collaborative Optimization method [Braun, 1996]. 
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Particularly, the concept of “systems of systems” has been proposed [Sobieszczanski-
Sobieski, 2008; Arroyo et al., 2009] to address the analysis of a set of closely coupled 
systems. MDO approaches usually assume the designer has control over all subsystems. 
Yet these methods can become difficult to implement in a market system where 
manufacturers source modules from different suppliers instead of having full control 
(designing and building all of the modules in-house).   
This chapter proposes a new approach for handling coupling or interoperability 
among subsystems of a product sourced from supplies. Interoperability refers to the 
capabilities of different systems (or subsystem) to work together [IEEE, 2000]. A 
commonly agreed definition of interoperability is not available. Existing works have 
proposed standards and qualitative recommendations to improve interoperability, for 
instance, for software engineering applications [e.g., Morris et al., 2004] and for a 
network of systems to exchange information [e.g., Tolk and Muguira, 2003]. Here, 
interoperability is referred to as the capabilities of subsystems (or modules of a product) 
to maintain their engineering feasibility when coupled with other subsystems under 
uncertainty. A quantitative metric for evaluating interoperability, particularly as 
applicable to product design, has not yet been reported.  
On the other hand, multidisciplinary robust optimization methods have been 
investigated to consider both interval [e.g., Li and Azarm, 2008] and probabilistic [e.g., 
Liu et al., 2006] uncertainties, particularly with interdisciplinary uncertainty propagations 
(i.e., transmission of uncertainties among subsystems through the coupling variables). 
Robust optimization methods [e.g., Li and Azarm, 2008] obtain a design solution in such 
a way that the coupling variables stay within an acceptable range. Such conditions can be 
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difficult to achieve if there are significant variations in the parameters such that the 
coupling variables are no longer consistent across the systems. Meanwhile, in a design 
selection problem where the subsystems are procured from different suppliers, the 
product designer can hardly confine the coupling variables because the subsystems are 
provided by different suppliers. In this study, each subsystem is considered to have a 
range of operations under which the system operation remains feasible (or acceptable) 
given the uncertainties in the inputs.  
The objective for this part of the research thus becomes formulating a general 
mathematical model for selecting a combination of subsystems (or modules) such that the 
ranges of operation among the subsystems (couplings) overlap as much as possible (or 
are acceptable). 
II. Accounting for the couplings between products and services to address 
downstream interoperability with service providers.  
There is an increasing number of products whose functionalities are closely coupled 
with functionalities offered by service providers, for instance, smartphone (coupled with 
wireless services) and tablet computers (coupled with digital content services). For such 
products, the main issue in the design selection is the interoperability between the design 
of the product and the associated service(s). This area has received little attention in the 
existing literature. On the other hand, Product-Service Systems (PSS) have been 
investigated as the manufacturers’ initiatives to introduce a variety of services as add-ons 
to the product offering in order to improve profitability [Baines et al., 2007]. Examples 
include automobiles with financing services [Williams, 2006], elevators with 
maintenance services, copiers with leasing and rental services, etc. However, the reported 
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PSS methods overlook products whose functions are closely coupled with the services, 
particularly from the designer’s point of view. For instance, the quality of digital video 
streaming services depends on the capabilities of the mobile devices or computers 
through which the service is delivered. In contrast to the previous works, this study 
explicitly models such couplings by accounting for the interoperability between the 
product functions and service activities.  In addition, service providers are considered as a 
different player in the downstream market system, as opposed to the existing PSS 
frameworks in which the manufacturer itself is considered as the service provider [Baines 
et al., 2007].  For example, wireless services are usually offered by telecommunication 
service providers rather than the mobile phone manufactures. The practice of marketing 
combinations of products and services has also been studied in the business domains. For 
instance, Shanker et al. [Shanker et al., 2009] review a number of strategies of combining 
products and services. Aribarg and Foutz [Aribarg and Foutz, 2009] study the consumer 
choice decision when purchasing a product (e.g., a cell phone) and the corresponding 
service (e.g., wireless service plan). But the reported works do not consider the 
implications of combining products and services from the perspective of product design.  
The objective for this part of the research is thus to exploring a method that accounts 
for interoperability among the product modules and the services while making product 
design selection. 
III. Integrating the considerations of upstream market players (suppliers) and 




Existing works in engineering design have accounted for upstream and downstream 
market systems. For instance, the upstream market system has been considered by 
combining design decisions and supply chain configuration decisions [Chiu and Okudan, 
2011]. Downstream market system is considered by integrating consumer choice 
behavior and the action-reactions of competitors like manufacturers and retailers [e.g., 
Hoyle et al., 2010; Shiau and Michalek, 2009; Williams et al., 2011] for design decisions. 
Meanwhile, despite the efforts to adapt engineering design methods to design product-
service systems [Kim et al., 2010], no previous work has been found that considers the 
integration of service providers as downstream market players combined with upstream 
supply chain players with interoperability considerations.  
The objective for this part of the research is to devise an integrated decision 
framework which considers: (i) interoperability of modules sourced from upstream 
suppliers, (ii) downstream customer demand, and (iii) interoperability of the product with 
downstream service providers’ offerings.   
4.2 TERMINOLOGY, PROBLEM DEFINITION AND FRAMEWORK  
4.2.1 Terminology 
The term “system” refers to a mathematical representation of an engineered system. 
Every system i can be modeled as a “black-box” with inputs xi, outputs oi, and parameters 
pi defining the system as shown in Figure 4.1(a). The input xi is usually interpreted as 
design variables whose values can be specified by the designer. For instance, xi can 
represent the physical dimensions of a component. Parameters (i.e., pi) are values which 
the designer cannot control, e.g., density of steel, conductivity of cooper, material’s yield 
strength, usage conditions and so on. For the majority of engineered system, the values of 
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the parameters are uncertain. In this way, instead of a fixed value, a parameter can be 
considered to have either finite or infinite number of possible values. Denote the set of all 
possible values of pi using Pi.  Vector p = { p1, p2 , ……} is used to denote the collection 
of pi for all i. In this study, each system is assumed to have its own design variables (i.e., 
xi) and parameters (i.e., pi). The shared variables and parameters among different systems 
(or subsystems) are not considered. 
Another type of input (or output) is a coupling variable, denoted by yij . A coupling 
variable is usually the input of one system (or subsystem) and the output of another. The 
values of the output coupling variables for a system can be determined once the design 
variables, parameters and input coupling variables of the coupled systems are given. 
Figure 4.1(b) presents an example of two coupled systems, namely, System 1 and System 
2. The coupling variable y12 is an output from System 1 and an input to System 2. 
Meanwhile, the coupling variable y21 is an output from System 2 and input to System 1.  
The mapping from system input to output can be denoted by (oi, yij)=fi (xi , pi , yji). The 
system output oi can include a number of constraint functions, i.e., gi (xi , pi , yji) ≤ 0.  
The term “module” refers to a physical or software unit of a product which performs 
one or more functions. In general, a product can be considered as an integrated system 
with several (or many modules) with each module being considered as one of the 
subsystems of the product. In this study, the term “subsystem” and “module” are used 
interchangeably. 
The term “interoperability” is a range reflecting the extent to which two (or more) 
coupled systems (or subsystems) can operate together seamlessly. The formulation of 
interoperability will be presented in Section 4.3. In this study, “upstream interoperability” 
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refers to the interoperability among the product modules; “downstream interoperability” 




Figure 4.1 Definitions: (a) system, (b) two coupled systems 
 
4.2.2 Problem Definition, Assumptions and Framework 
The problem is defined as following. As shown in Figure 4.2, a manufacturing 
company is positioned in the market system with both upstream and downstream market 
players. Along the upstream, the manufacturer sources product modules designed by a 
variety of suppliers. Each module has a number of candidate suppliers to choose from. It 
is assumed that, for each subsystem (or module), the design specifications from the 
candidate suppliers are different. Along the downstream, the product is purchased by 
customers having heterogeneous choice behaviors. The customers purchase the product 
and subscribe to the associated services in order to perform the functionalities of the 
product. 
The following are the key assumptions. (i) The product is modular with all the 
modules sourced from suppliers. Thus the product design problem is essentially a module 
















options (or suppliers) to choose from. (ii) the product has at least one function which 
requires the consumers to subscribe to services, for instance, a smartphone requires the 
consumers to subscribe to the wireless data service from the service providers. (iii) each 
service can be decomposed into a number of activities. For instance, an activity for the 
service of “digital video streaming” can be “transmitting digital content”. The service 
activities are supported by the corresponding modules of the product. For instance, the 
activity “transmitting digital content” may require a “wireless connectivity” module of 
the product. Additionally, the product designer should decide which service provider to 
integrate with. (iv) For both upstream and downstream market systems, the competitors 
are considered to be static. That is, the action-reactions of market players are not 
considered. 
The objective of the designer is to achieve the optimal demand (D) and/or market 
share, when accounting for the interoperability for both upstream and downstream 
markets, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
  
Figure 4.2 Problem Definition 












The design selection framework is presented in Figure 4.3. A vector xp denotes the 
design specification of all the product modules. A finite number of feasible values for xp 
are available from a lookup table which contains the design specifications from all the 
suppliers’ offerings. The function g(xp)≤0 represents engineering constraints such as  the 
upper limit on the maximum torque input to a gear set. Likewise, a vector xs denotes the 
service attributes available from a lookup table containing the attributes of all the service 
providers’ offerings. The designer selects the alternative with the maximum demand 
subject to the condition that interoperability is within an acceptable threshold specified by 
the designer. The threshold for upstream and downstream interoperability can be different. 
The market share can be estimated by the aggregation of probability of choice at the 
individual consumer level. The consumers’ purchase decisions are determined by both 
the product attributes (i.e., Xp) and service attributes (i.e., Xs). The attributes are 
functions of design specifications of selected product modules and services. For instance, 
the attribute of “product weight” for an angle grinder is a function of the design 




Figure 4.3 Design Selection Framework  
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the design selection method. A mathematical formulation of 
interoperability, along with a numerical procedure to estimate interoperability will be 
presented in Section 4.3.1. The proposed model is then used for computing the 
interoperability along the upstream market system and then extended to analyze the 
interoperability along the downstream market system in Section 4.3.2. The consideration 
of customers along the downstream market system borrows the methods from the 
previous research [e.g., Williams et al., 2008] and will be discussed in Section 4.3.3.  
4.3.1 Modeling Upstream Interoperability 
The mathematical formulation of interoperability is discussed in four steps. 
(i) Definition of Interoperability. Interoperability is defined as a capability of two (or 
more) systems to maintain their feasibility when coupled under uncertainty. Consider the 








max : D (Xp , Xs)
w.r.t. xp , xs
s.t. 
Upstream interoperability  ≥  I0up
Downstream interoperability ≥  I0down
g (xp) ≤ 0




functions fi which maps the inputs (i.e. xi, pi  and  yji) to outputs (i.e., oi,and yij). Each 
system has a set of engineering constraints gi (xi , pi , yji) ≤ 0 denoting the feasibility of the 
system. Consider the example presented in Figure 4.1(b). The two systems are coupled by 
the variables y12 and y21. Therefore, the two systems are said to be interoperable for a 
given design (x1, x2) and parameter (p1, p2), if there exists values of coupling variables 
(y12, y21) such that: 
    0,;,,; 112111121112  pxygpxyfy  , and 
    0,;,,; 221222212221  pxygpxyfy  
(4.1) 
A point (y12, y21) which makes two systems interoperable is named as an 
Interoperable Point. In general, two coupled systems can have more than one 
interoperable point when their designs (x1, x2) are given. This is because the position of 
the interoperable point can change as the value of system parameters (p1, p2) varies. 
Meanwhile, the interoperable point(s) changes as the design (x1, x2) changes.  
(ii)  Region of Operation (ROO) and Region of Interoperability (ROI). In a design 
selection problem defined in Section 4.2.2, the designer of the product only has a finite 
number of options for the values of design variables due to the fact that the modules are 
sourced from suppliers. Additionally, there can be uncertainties in the parameters. It is 
thus desirable that a module i can be interoperable with another coupled module at a 
variety of interoperable points for the entire range of uncertainties in system parameters. 
To begin with, the Region of Operation (ROO) for a module (or subsystem) i is defined 
as: 
    ijiiiiiiijiii  ,0,;,,;:| pxygpxyfyPpyROO  (4.2) 
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The above equation defines a region in which subsystem i is feasible for any given 
value of input coupling variables and uncertain parameters. The variations in the 
parameters can be characterized by probabilistic density functions. For instance, the 
parameter pi can be assumed to be normally distributed: pi ~N(μ, σ2). Or pi can be 
considered to have an interval uncertainty and assumed to be uniformly distributed: 
],[ iii ppp   with ip  and ip   being the lower and upper bounds.  
By comparing Eqns. (4.1) and (4.2), it can be understood that the interoperable points 
are essentially the intersections of regions of operations of the two systems for a range of 
uncertain parameters. The designer’s interest is therefore in such intersections because 
these intersections are the regions where the subsystems can be interoperable. The 





   (4.3) 
More specifically: 
    jiij  ,,0,;,,;:| iiiiii pxygpxyfyPpyROI  (4.4) 
Consider the two system example shown in Figure 4.1(b). A graphical interpretation 
of region of operation and region of interoperability is shown in Figure 4.4. At a given x1, 
ROO1 consists of all the points (y12, y21) such that for any given value for y21 and a range 
of p1: y12=f1(y21,x1, p1) and g1(y21,x1, p1) ≤ 0, is feasible. Likewise, ROO2 consists of 
points such that for any given y12 and a range of p2, the input-output mapping and 
feasibility of System 2 are maintained. The region of interoperability is therefore the 




Figure 4.4 Regions of Operation (ROO) and Region of Interoperability (ROI) 
ROO and ROI can be interpreted in many ways depending on the area of application. 
In the design of a cordless angle grinder (to be presented in Section 4.4 as a case study), 
System 1 is an electric motor and System 2 is a bevel gear transmission. The two systems 
are coupled by the coupling variables “Torque” and “Shaft mass” as presented in Figure 
4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5 Interpretation of ROO and ROI: A Cordless Angle Grinder Example 
 
 (iii) Interoperability Metric. The interoperability of system i can be reflected by the 
area ratio of the region of interoperability (i.e., ROI) over the summation of regions of 
operation (i.e., ROOi for all i). In general, the area ratio will become volume ratio (for 
three dimensions) or hyper volume ratio (for more than three dimensions) when the 
















The interoperability metric is thus a numerical value between 0 and 1. Denote the 
area of ROI as AROI and area of ROOi as AROO,i. The interoperability metric (IM) can then 











 (iv) Calculating the Interoperability Metric: A Monte Carlo Method. The input-
output mappings of many engineering systems are nonlinear, discrete or in a black-box 
form. In general, the region of operation may not be of any particular shape, which makes 
the area of ROO and ROI difficult to obtain in a closed form. A numerical method based 
on a Monte Carlo sampling procedure is proposed to approximate the value of IM.  
As shown in Figure 4.6, the procedure can be carried out in two steps.  
  
Figure 4.6 Calculate IM: A Monte Carlo Procedure 
Step 1: Perform the following operation for each subsystem (xi is fixed). First 
generate random samples of coupling variables yji and parameters pi for system i. Next, 
obtain a corresponding system output yij using yij=fi (yji , xi , pi). The samples will be 













belong to any ROOi will be deleted. Denote the number of points in ROOi as Ni with 
i=1,…,I where I denotes the total number of coupled systems. 
Step 2: This step aims at finding out the points in each ROO which fall into the ROI 
using its definition in Eqn. (4.4). For each given point y from the ROO of a subsystem i, 
verifying Eqn. (4.4) means the following: if there exists a ii Pp *  (for all i) such that: 
yij=fi(yji,xi, pi*) and gi (yji,xi, pi*) ≤ 0 (for all i and all j), then y is indeed a point in ROI. 
This verification is equivalent to solving the following problem:   






This optimization problem should be solved for every point in ROOi (for all i). Denote 
the number of points in ROOi that falls into ROI with NROI, i. This can be 
computationally expensive. As such an alternative (heuristic) procedure is proposed next. 
Step 2—an alternative heuristic procedure. For each point y in ROOi, check the 
samples of p obtained in Step 1 and find out if there exists one (or multiple)  ..., ,21 ppp   
such that: (i)    jjjjk pxyfy ,;  for all j ≠ i and k, and (ii)   0,; jjijj pxyg  for all j. 
The tolerance ε needs to be specified by the designer. If both conditions are satisfied, the 
point y can be considered to satisfy Eqn. (4.4). After repeating the above for every point 
in ROOi , denote the total number of points of subsystem i falling into ROI (i.e., 
satisfying Eqn. (4.4)) with  NROI, i. The above needs to be conducted for every subsystem i. 






















4.3.2 Modeling downstream interoperability 
Service by a provider (e.g., wireless by Verizon, video streaming by Amazon) is a 
process consisting of interrelated activities. This definition follows the research in service 
modeling [e.g., Shostack, 1984]. For instance, a digital video streaming service can be 
considered to be composed of activities such as “transmitting/receiving video signal”, 
“processing video data signal” and “playing video content”. The implementation of 
activities depends on the functionalities of the product. For instance, an activity for the 
service of “digital video streaming” can be “transmitting digital content”. Performing 
such an activity requires a product function of “send/receive wireless signal”. The 
interoperability of a product and a service is ultimately determined by the interoperability 
between the product modules and service activities. The concept of the interoperability 
metric discussed in 4.3.1 can be extended to service domain to measure the 
interoperability, as discussed by the following three steps: 
(1) Construct Activity Function Dependency Matrix. An activity needs to be 
supported by function(s) which the product modules implement.  Note that for some 
activities two or more product functions may be needed. An “Activity Function 
Dependency Matrix” is defined to represent such dependency between service activities 
and product functions. Specifically: AF=(AF)ij, i=1,…I, j=1,…J, where AFij=1 if activity 
i depends on function j, AFij=0 if it does not. The entries in the matrix AF indicates all 
the activity-function pairs for which interoperability needs to be calculated. 
(2) Identify Key Performance Attributes. For each activity-module pair as denoted by 
AFij=1, Key Performance Attributes (KPA) is defined as a vector characterizing the 
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interface between the activity and the module. Index the activity-module pairs using 
t=1,…,T. Similarly to the region of operation for a module, the region of operation for an 
activity is defined as a region in the space of KPA parameters in which the activity can 
operate. The KPA is comparable to the coupling variables for analyzing physical systems. 
(3) Calculate Interoperability. The interoperability metric is obtained by calculating 
the percentage of intersecting areas between the ROO of service activities and product 











where a index of  t=1,…,T denotes the activity-function pairs. 
4.3.3 Modeling individual level customer choice behavior 
Another group of critical players along the downstream market are the customers. 
The designer’s objectives, either the profit or market share, depend heavily on the 
customer’s purchase decision. A popular model representing the purchase decisions is 
Multinomial Logit model [McFadden, 1980]. In this study, the customers’ choice 
behavior is modeled using the latent class Multinomial Logit model proposed in the 
previous literature [Williams et al., 2008]. 
Denote the customers using i (i=1,…,I) and the choice alternatives using j (j=1,…,J). 
Following the model in [McFadden, 1980], a customer’s preference can be represented 
by a random utility function: 
isjsipjpiji   ,,,,, XXU  (4.9) 
in which Ui,j denotes the utility for customer i for choosing alternative j, Xp represents the 
attributes of the product and Xs represents the attributes of the service(s). Xp can be 
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obtained using a mapping from the product design specifications. The term εi is the error 
term with a double exponential distribution. Assume that the customer makes the 
purchase decision by choosing the alternative with the maximum utility. The probability 
that the customer i chooses alternative j can be formulated as: 
 










where Ui,NC denotes the utility of “no-choice” option (i.e., to purchase none of the 
alternatives). 
The above formulation can be extended. For instance, a latent class model can be 
used to account for the heterogeneity of the customers. Specifically, the customers are 
grouped into unique “segments”. The preferences are identical within a segment but 
different across segments. A latent class model is formulated as: 
 













mji ,Pr  
(4.11) 
in which ms represents the size of segment s in percentage. It can also be interpreted as 
the probability that a customer belongs to segment s. By summing the probability in Eqn. 
(4.11) over all the customers, the market share can be obtained as the aggregated 
probability of choice. 
4.4 EXAMPLES 
The proposed design selection method is demonstrated by two case studies. In the 
first case study, a design selection problem for a cordless angle grinder is considered. 
This example is used to demonstrate the application of the interoperability metric for 
modeling upstream (supplier) interoperability while considering the demand in the 
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downstream market system. In the second case study, a tablet computer design selection 
problem is presented which considers both upstream (supplier) and downstream (service 
provider) interoperabilities. 
4.4.1 Design Selection for Cordless Angle Grinder 
A cordless angle grinder is a handheld electric power tool which can be used to 
remove surface material from a work piece. The example considered consists of three 
subsystems: a battery (or subsystem 1), an electric motor (or subsystem 2), and a bevel 
gear set (or subsystem 3). The engineering design model is adapted from the previous 
work by Li et al. [Li et al., 2010] with the following changes. Specifically, the shared 
input for the three subsystems as presented in [Li et al. 2010] are converted into inputs 
for individual subsystems; additionally, the one way coupling between the “battery pack” 
and “electric motor” subsystems are changed from “Current” to “Voltage”.   The design 
variables for each subsystem are shown in Table 4.1.  The battery and the motor 
subsystems are coupled by the coupling variable “Voltage” (or y12) which is an output 
from the battery. The motor and the bevel gear subsystems are coupled by the coupling 
variables “Torque Load” (or y23) and “Shaft Mass” (or y32). Each subsystem has its own 
set of constraints including lower and upper bounds of the design variables, as well as 
inequality constraints (equality constraints are converted into two equivalent inequality 
constraints.). For instance, the bevel gear system is constrained by the condition that the 
maximum stress on the gear teeth does not exceed the limit. The parameters are 
considered to have interval uncertainty. The range of uncertainty for all parameters is 





Table 4.1 Angle Grinder Subsystems and Design Variables 
Battery (Subsystem 1) Motor (Subsystem 2) Bevel Gear (Subsystem 3)  
xp,1 Battery cell height (mm) x p,8 Armature turns x p,16 Gear ratio 
x p,2 Ni reactant sheet thickness (um) x p,9 Stator turns x p,17 Pinion pitch (m) 
x p,3 Cd reactant sheet thickness (um) x p,10 Stator outer radius (m) x p,18 Motor-gear shaft length (m) 
x p,4 Separator sheet thickness (um) x p,11 Stator thickness (m) y 23 Torque load 
x p,5 Battery cell coil turns x p,12 Gap length (m)   
x p,6 No. of cells x p,13 Stack length (m)   
x p,7 Current  (amps) x p,14 Motor-gear shaft diameter (m)   
  x p,15 Load  RPM   
  y12 Voltage (v)   
  y32 Shaft mass    
 
The design selection problem is shown in Figure 4.7. The three key subsystems (or 
modules) are assumed to be sourced from suppliers. Each module has 10 candidate 
suppliers and there is only one option available from each supplier. Thus the total number 
of design alternatives equals 103 or 1000. Table 4.2 presents the design specifications of 
the suppliers’ offerings. The design specifications are randomly generated under the 
condition that the feasibility constraints of each subsystem are satisfied. 
 
Figure 4.7 Case Study 1: Cordless Angle Grinder 
Along the downstream, the product is targeted at a heterogeneous customer 











max : D (xp)
w.r.t. xp
s.t. 
IM (xp) ≥ I0







by Williams et al. [Williams et al., 2008] is applied. The model categorizes the market 
into 4 segments. Customer observed product attributes include price, brand, amp, battery 
life, girth, weight and retail channel. The customers’ choice decisions are made out of 
four competing cordless angel grinders including the new product. In this study, the price 
is fixed at $50. The proposed method can be easily extended to handle pricing decisions 
by adding one additional decision variable. 
The design selection proceeds as follows. The designer evaluates all combinations of 
battery, motor and gear from different suppliers. Each alternative is evaluated against the 
interoperability metric as well as downstream market share. The alternative which yields 
the maximum market share is selected if it is feasible and leads to a value of the  
Table 4.2 Angle Grinder Suppliers’ Design Specifications 
             Battery Suppliers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
xp,1 50.993 18.905 64.819 27.657 19.512 58.965 19.795 78.364 79.995 74.464 
x p,2 4.711 3.917 23.891 40.693 42.524 33.087 15.326 28.551 39.325 5.029 
x p,3 47.822 64.835 33.854 53.659 53.113 75.258 34.933 94.657 64.585 59.595 
x p,4 15.601 76.095 38.877 66.209 28.930 21.725 40.959 75.463 26.079 68.609 
x p,5 1.073 1.694 1.518 1.565 1.891 1.102 1.532 1.735 1.482 1.739 
x p,6 1.881 1.603 1.443 1.593 1.510 1.124 1.150 1.006 1.827 1.760 
x p,7 2.032 1.543 1.985 1.048 1.858 1.708 2.215 2.031 1.042 1.115 
             Motor Suppliers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
x p,8 165.051 128.302 55.602 216.380 126.107 24.216 194.793 69.877 185.981 175.139 
x p,9 173.732 174.796 190.834 69.362 121.356 188.606 99.047 90.141 73.929 129.414 
x p,10 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.008 
x p,11 0.031 0.057 0.041 0.031 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.057 0.023 0.052 
x p,12 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
x p,13 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.018 
x p,14 36109 32471 50429 54408 49670 67044 14830 70898 77829 19055 
x p,15 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 
             Bevel Gear Suppliers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
x p,16 0.321 0.233 0.262 0.343 0.215 0.390 0.317 0.231 0.235 0.369 
x p,17 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.013 




interoperability metric higher than a given threshold. In this case study, the thresholds for 
the interoperability metric are obtained by finding out the Pareto frontier with two 
objectives: (i) maximize upstream interoperability, and (ii) maximize downstream 
demand. The interoperability metric values of the Pareto points are used as the thresholds. 
The design selection decisions obtained at all the thresholds will be shown. 
The design selection results are presented in Table 4.3. First, a benchmark design 
decision is obtained by assuming that the subsystems are manufactured in-house rather 
than being sourced from the suppliers. That is, the designer can choose the design 
variable values (since they are assumed to be continuous) without being limited by the 
suppliers’ options. Therefore, the design space is larger than that in the design selection 
problem as defined in Figure 4.7. The objective in the benchmark problem is to minimize 
cost. The cost model is borrowed from the attribute based model proposed by [Williams 
et al., 2008]. Neither the upstream interoperability nor the downstream demand is 
considered in the benchmark. 
Figure 4.8 presents the scatter plot of all the 1000 candidate designs. Note that there 
are only a finite number of combinations of product attribute values. Therefore, the 
demand (or market share) for the design selection alternatives as shown in Figure 4.8 
form a number of parallel lines. The Pareto frontier is highlighted using black diamonds. 
The “Pareto point 1” in Table 4.3 represents the design having the maximum demand 
along the Pareto frontier.  The “Pareto point 2” in Table 4.3 represents the design having 
the maximum upstream interoperability along the Pareto frontier. 
By looking at the benchmark design, the interoperability is low comparing to either 
one of the two Pareto design points. Even though the modules are all produced in-house 
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by a single manufacturer, the interoperability is not necessarily better since the design 
decision is only driven by the cost. This is observed in other real world situations as well: 
when the designer tries to reduce the production cost, the product performance may be 
sacrificed.  Note that the benchmark design actually achieves a higher level of demand 
than both Pareto designs. This is primarily due to the fact that the design space is larger in 
the benchmark problem. Comparing the two Pareto designs, the interoperability metric 
values are very close. Following this observation, the designer is given the freedom to 
pursue better market penetration without decreasing the interoperability significantly.  








Pareto point 1: 
Maximum  
demand 
Pareto point 2: 
Maximum 
interoperability 
 Supplier No. N/A 9 4 
Battery 
xp,1 13.188 79.995 27.657 
x p,2 2.127 39.325 40.693 
x p,3 4.343 64.585 53.659 
x p,4 5.274 26.079 66.209 
x p,5 849.788 1.482 1.565 
x p,6 1.044 1.827 1.593 
x p,7 1.000 1.042 1.048 
 Supplier No. N/A 6 6 
Motor 
x p,8 158.784 24.216 24.216 
x p,9 10.000 188.606 188.606 
x p,10 0.010 0.008 0.008 
x p,11 0.076 0.037 0.037 
x p,12 0.001 0.001 0.001 
x p,13 0.020 0.018 0.018 
x p,14 1002.256 67044 67044 
x p,15 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 Supplier No. N/A 2 7 
Bevel 
gear 
x p,16 3.804 0.233 0.317 
x p,17 0.030 0.014 0.009 
x p,18 0.010 0.006 0.006 
Interoperability  
metric 
0.103 0.265 0.266 
Demand  
(market share) 






Figure 4.8 Pareto Frontier of Angle Grinder Example 
One important decision which a designer (manufacturer) usually has to deal with is: 
how to choose a supplier and establish a long term contract? Using the proposed 
interoperability metric, the designer can evaluate the suppliers from an engineering 
design perspective. The “average interoperability” of each supplier’s module can be 
obtained by combining the module with available options from all the other subsystems, 
and calculate the mean value of the interoperability metric of all such combinations. For 
instance, for a motor supplier’s offering, the motor can be potentially combined with 10 
battery options and 10 bevel gear options (100 combinations in total). Average 
interoperability reflects the ability of a supplier’s offering to be compatible with all the 
other suppliers. Knowing the average interoperability is particularly important if for those 
subsystems which cannot be easily modified for an extended period of time—either due 
to the manufacturer-supplier contract or due to the long research and development 
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Pareto point 1:
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interval. In this way, for instance, the designer may want to choose a motor with the 
highest average interoperability so that the design can be easily adapted if changes are 
made with respect to the supply of the battery or the bevel gear subsystem. As shown in 
Figure 4.9, the best suppliers are, respectively: supplier 10 for battery (average 
IM=0.246), supplier 6 for the motor (average IM=0.251), and supplier 4 (average 
IM=0.245), for the gear.  
 
Figure 4.9 Average Interoperability of Angle Grinder Suppliers 
4.4.2 Product Design Selection and Service Integration for a Tablet Computer 
In the second case study, the product design selection for a tablet computer 
considering both the upstream (suppliers) and downstream (service providers) is 
considered. The designer sources the electronic components such as: microprocessor, 
LCD display panel, wireless connectivity module and battery. Table 4.4 lists the suppliers 
and the attributes of each supplier’s offerings. The upstream interoperability involves the 
coupling between the processor and LCD display. Specifically, the processing capability 
of the processor in terms of resolution will be compared with the LCD display resolution. 




































































Table 4.5 presents a simple model for computing engineering characteristics such as 
battery life, product weight and bit rate. 
Table 4.4 Tablet Computer Suppliers  
Module 1: LCD  
Supplier No. 
xp,1  











1  5.7  480  5.6  250 
2  7  480  5.75 175 
3  9.7  768  9  165 
4  10.1  800  10  185 




Color processing capacity 
 (Bits per pixel) 
xp,6 
Resolution processing capacity 
(horizontal px) 
  
1   24  1080    
2   16  1050    
3   60  1080    
Module 3: Battery  
Supplier No. 
xp,7 
Weight (g)  
xp,8 
Capacity (Watt Hour)  
xp,9 
size  (inches) 
 
1  150  37  6   
2  200  50  7   
3  250  60  10   




   
1  4G     
2  Wi-Fi     
3  Wi-Fi + 4G     
  
Along the downstream, the designer also needs to make the decision of selecting the 
service providers. Two categories of digital services are to be supported by the product, 
namely, video streaming and electronic newspaper subscription. Each category of service 
has two candidate service providers to select from. The video streaming is a service 
which instantly transmits video contents (e.g., TV episodes and/or movies) to electronic 
devices through internet connections. Examples of existing service providers include 
Netflix and Hulu. The newspaper subscription service delivers the digital copies of 
newspapers to the electronic devices. Major players in the market include Amazon 
Kindle and Barnes and Noble. The interoperability along the downstream involves the 
couplings between the product functions and service activities. For instance, the 
107 
 
microprocessor provides functionalities such as processing video signal, the wireless 
connectivity module transmits and receives signal from service providers, the LCD 
display present sthe video contents to the user and the battery provides power for the 
other modules. Table 4.5 presents a list of KPAs for each service and their corresponding 
product modules. The corresponding product modules for each service activity are shown 
in the parenthesis. The KPAs have both numerical and categorical values. For the 
numerical values, the numbers in Table 4.6 indicates the upper bounds of the 
corresponding KPA.  
Table 4.5 Tablet Computer Engineering Attribute Calculations 
Bit rate (Mbs) Br=R*C*F, where: 
R: resolution (total pixels) 
C: Color (bits per pixel) 
F: Frame rate (frames per second) 
Power Consumption P=P0+Pprocessor+Plcd 
Battery Life BL=Bc/P, where: 
Bc: battery capacity (Watt Hour) 
Product Weight W=WLCD+Wbattey+W0 
 
The demand model is a basic Multinomial Logit model as formulated in Eqn. (4.11). 
The customer level attributes include: LCD screen size and resolution, price, product 
weight, battery life, wireless connection, video streaming service picture quality and 
selection range, newspaper subscription content quality and selection range. The values 
of the coefficients in the demand model are simulated.  
Table 4.6 Downstream Service Providers 
Video Streaming  xs,1   
Transmit Content (Wireless) 
xs,2  
Display Content (Microprocessor) 
Service Provider 1 Bit rate: 2.5 Mbs 720 px 
Service Provider 2 Bit rate: 5 Mbs 1080 px 
Newspaper Subscription xs,3  
Display Content (Microprocessor) 
xs,4  
Newspaper Delivery (Wireless) 
Service Provider 1 Color Instant/Download 




Table 4.7 presents the design selection results. The design selection involves the 
evaluation of 432 design alternatives (i.e., combinations of 4 suppliers for LCD module,  












supplier No. 2 4 4 
Size (inches) 7 10.1 10.1 
Resolution 
(horizontal pixels) 
480 800 800 
Processor 
Module supplier No. 3 1 2 
Color (bits per pixel) 60 24 16 
Resolution 
(horizontal pixels) 
1080 1080 1050 
Battery 
supplier No. 1 3 3 
Battery weight (g) 150 250 250 
Battery capacity 
(wh) 
37 60 60 
Battery size 
(inches) 
6 10 10 
Wireless 
Connection 
supplier No. 2 3 3 
Wireless 
connection 





Video streaming service 
provider No. 
1 2 2 
Transmission bit rate 
(Mbs) 
2.5 5 5 
Content resolution 
(pixels) 






1 2 2 
Content color 
(B&W/Color) 
Color B&W B&W 
Delivery 
(Wi-fi, 4G or both) 
Wi-Fi and 4G Wi-Fi Wi-Fi 
Upstream interoperability 0.422 0.231 0.222 
Downstream interoperability 0.170 0.426 0.432 
Demand (market share) 0.999 0.714 0.354 
 
3 suppliers for the Processor module, 3 suppliers for the Battery module, 3 suppliers for 
the Wireless module, 2 service providers for Digital Video Streaming, and 2 service 
providers for Newspaper Subscription). Each alternative is evaluated against three 
objectives: (i) to maximize downstream demand, (ii) to maximize downstream (service) 
interoperability and (iii) to maximize upstream (product) interoperability. The Pareto 
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frontier consists of 12 design alternatives. Three Pareto points having the highest value 
for each objective are presented in Table 4.7. The demand maximizing design (or design 
#1) integrates the smallest LCD display with the lowest level of resolution. It also 
involves a wireless module having Wi-Fi only even if its downstream service providers 
offer both downloading (requiring either Wi-Fi or 4G) and instant access (requiring 4G) 
to the digital contents.  Therefore, the downstream interoperability metric value is less 
than 50% of those of the other two designs. The designs maximizing upstream and 
downstream interoperability differ only in terms of the selection of processors. The 
downstream interoperability maximizing design (i.e., design #2) selects a processor with 
slightly better color and resolution processing capabilities. As a result, it “over qualifies” 
regarding the newspaper subscription service which only provides black and white 
contents, which leads to a small decrease in the downstream interoperability.  
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a solution to the challenges of design selection in the context of 
both upstream and downstream market systems while considering interoperability. A 
model for system interoperability is proposed that can help the designer measure the 
compatibility of product modules and selecting upstream suppliers. The formulation is 
general and can be applicable to other fields of study such as analyzing “system of 
systems” (system engineering) and mechanical tolerancing (mechanical design). 
Additionally, the framework contributes to the existing literature in engineering design by 
filling the gap of quantitatively understanding the couplings between physical (tangible) 
product modules and intangible service components.  Considering both product design 
and downstream service providers is increasingly important as evidenced in many high-
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tech product markets where the products’ functions heavily rely on the customers’ 
subscription to associated services. Finally, this study links the upstream and downstream 
market systems by considering the key market players such as: suppliers, manufacturer 
(designer), service provider and customers in the product design selection decisions.  
In the next chapter, the dissertation will be concluded. Contributions will be 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates the product design decisions for market systems by 
integrating engineering design and marketing considerations. The design decisions 
attempt to maximize manufacturer profit and/or demand by accounting for: (i) the action-
reactions of market players, such as competing manufacturers, retail channels; (ii) 
convergence of existing product categories into a new niche market and (iii) 
interoperability along both upstream and downstream market systems. 
This chapter is organized as following. Section 5.1 provides concluding remarks for 
each research thrust. Section 5.2 highlights the contributions of the dissertation research. 
Section 5.3 discusses the limitations of the methods and present future research directions.  
5.1 SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION 
In Chapter 2, an agent based approach is presented to support design decisions in the 
market system with interactive market players. Specifically: 
 The design decision method supports the designers for both long term and short term 
decisions. Long term decisions involve selecting the product features that cannot be 
changed in a long term horizon; whereas short term decisions concerns the strategies 
to react to the moves of market players for the short term, for instance, price 
competition, product feature improvements,  retail channels’ pricing changes, etc. 
 An agent based simulation is proposed in order to (i) obtain market equilibrium in 
terms of demand and profit for the short term horizon, and (ii) devise short term 
design and pricing strategies for the focal manufacturer. Market players such as 
competing manufacturing firms and retail channels are modeled as learning agents. 
By learning it means the market players gradually learn to react to the moves of each 
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other. A no-regret learning algorithm is used to model the market system and 
equilibrium of the system can be analytically guaranteed.  
 In the case studies, the proposed approach is compared with game theoretic approach 
reported in the previous literature. The results indicate that when competing 
manufacturing firms compete on pricing, the agent based approach results in a similar 
prediction of the market equilibrium compared to the game theoretic approach. 
Additionally, the proposed method is shown to be applicable when competing 
manufactures also react by improving designs—a situation where the game theoretic 
approach cannot be applied. The result also suggests that a firm can establish long 
term advantage in profit by strategically selecting design alternatives.  
In Chapter 3, a profit maximizing design decision framework is investigated for 
convergence products. Specifically: 
 A modular design method is introduced for designing convergence products by 
selecting the modules from related existing product categories. The convergence 
product is designed by merging the modular structures of the existing product 
categories. The engineering design framework ensures that a selected product 
functionality will be supported by the product modules and sub-modules.  
 A hierarchical Bayes choice model is investigated to account for the heterogeneity of 
consumer preferences. Specifically, the model (i) represents the consumers’ purchase 
decisions at the individual customer level and (ii) explains the heterogeneity of the 
preferences of different consumers. The coefficients representing the consumers’ 
preferences for product attributes are formulated as functions of the individual 
specific usage situations of product functionalities. The model assumes that the 
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consumers devote significant cognitive effort to the evaluation of candidate products. 
This assumption is enforced in the choice-based conjoint survey where the 
respondents are asked to report their usage conditions of product features, consider 
the product attributes and then select the favorite product alternatives. However, in 
the real world market, there are consumers who make purchase decisions without 
devoting much cognitive effort, for instance, those who make impulsive purchase 
decisions. Such exceptions are not accounted for in the proposed model. Other 
models need to be explored to study the choice behavior of such customer segments. 
 Two metrics are proposed to assist the designer’s profit maximizing decision. The 
“Convergence Index” quantitatively reflects the similarity of the product architecture 
of a convergence product with respect to existing product categories. The index helps 
the designer to anticipate the size of the market for a convergence product—a new 
niche market which does not exist within any existing product categories. “Index of 
Usage Evolution” (IUE) considers the changes in consumer usage conditions and 
their preferences in the forthcoming purchase occasions and predicts how such 
adaptation influences future market penetration. IUE can be used align the design 
decision with not only the profit in the short run, but also a sustainable market 
penetration in the future.  
 The design optimization approach in Chapter 3 is demonstrated by solving a case 
study of designing a tablet computer and comparing the optimal designs under three 
different scenarios. It is worth noting that convergence products are potentially 
applicable to many product categories beyond consumer electronics—home 
appliances, power tools, medical devices—just to name a few.  
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In Chapter 4, the proposed design selection method adopts a more holistic perspective 
by considering both upstream and downstream market systems while considering 
interoperability. Specifically: 
 A mathematical model of interoperability is presented which defines (i) the Region of 
Operation (ROO), and (ii) the Region of Interoperation (ROI) which reflects the 
intersection of the ROO for the coupled systems—the region where the systems can 
work with each other. The formulation of interoperability is general and can be 
applicable beyond the design for market systems.  
 Using the mathematical formulation of system interoperability, the proposed method 
can help the designers make selection decisions when the product modules are to be 
outsourced. In other words, the method accounts for the suppliers along the upstream 
market system by analyzing the interoperability among outsourced subsystems (or 
modules). This idea is also extended to the downstream market system to evaluate the 
interoperability between a physical product and a service. The extension is of 
particular importance given the emerging trend in many high-tech product markets 
where customers utilize the features of the product by subscribing to a variety of 
services.  
5.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The proposed agent based approach in Research Thrust 1 addresses the strategic 
design decisions in an uncertain market environment. Specifically: 
 This dissertation provides a new approach for strategic product design decisions 
for uncertain market systems when the existing game theoretic methods cannot 
provide solutions. In other words, the proposed design decision method can 
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handle competitions involving complex design problems in which engineering 
systems is in black-box form. 
 The agent based method provides a more realistic perspective in modeling the 
uncertain market system as compared to existing game theoretic models, by 
accounting for the action-reactions among market players with learning behavior. 
 The approach provides the product designers, for the first time in literature, a 
method to pursue profitability by simultaneously determining: (i) the product 
features that cannot be changed for a long term horizon and (ii) the strategies to 
compete in the short term horizon by changing prices and product features that 
can be rapidly changed. 
The customer driven design decision framework proposed in Research Thrust 2 
addresses the challenges arising from the converging product markets. Specifically: 
 A modular design framework is developed to integrate design solutions from 
multiple existing product categories and handle the couplings of functionalities 
for the convergence product, a problem that has not been addressed in extant 
literature but is an important one given the proliferation of convergence products.  
 A new way of accounting for the heterogeneous consumer choice behaviors in 
product design decisions is investigated. The proposed hierarchical Bayes model 
considers the preference of each individual consumer and relates the preference to 
their unique ways of using the product functionalities. 
 The proposed Convergence Index (CI) predicts the potential market size for the 
convergence product by measuring its similarity to existing product categories; 
the proposed Index of Usage Evolution (IUE) considers the changes of consumer 
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usage conditions and their preferences in the forthcoming purchase occasions, 
which helps the product designers to focus beyond the objective of maximizing 
profit and pursue a sustainable market penetration in the future.  
Finally, the approach proposed in research thrust 3 provides a general formulation for 
analyzing system interoperability, which facilitates the design selection decision for both 
upstream and downstream market systems. Specifically: 
 A general model of system interoperability is proposed to analyze the ability of 
coupled systems to work together under uncertainty. The method fills the gap of a 
quantitative model to analyze system interoperability whereas the existing 
methods are primarily qualitative. 
 For the first time in Design for Market Systems, the downstream service providers 
are considered by accounting for the couplings between a physical product and 
intangible services using the proposed interoperability model.  
 The dissertation proposes the first method to connect the decisions regarding both 
the upstream supplier selection and downstream integration with service providers. 
The method addresses the challenges arising from the increasingly common 
practices of outsourcing product modules from suppliers (along the upstream 
market system) and bundling products with services (along the downstream 
market system). 
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Research Thrust 1: For demonstration purpose, the case study in this thrust only 
presented a finite number of design alternatives. The addition of an optimizer to the outer 
loop (i.e., the selection of long term design options) will enable the proposed approach to 
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search the long term design space systematically particularly when there are numerous 
(perhaps even infinite) number of long term alternatives. There are also many other 
directions for extending the current approach. For instance, the current approach can be 
computationally expensive when a large number of agents with multiple action 
dimensions enter into the model. The agents’ strategies are represented by probability 
density functions in black box form and therefore require Monte Carlo Markov Chain 
(MCMC) sampling steps to draw samples in every iteration in the simulation. This 
disadvantage can be alleviated to some extent by utilizing computers with multiple 
processors and perform agents sampling in parallel. Additionally, using approximation 
assisted optimization techniques [e.g., Hu et al., 2012] can overcome the issue by 
replacing the computationally expensive simulations with meta-models.  
Research Thrust 2: The results of this research thrust suggest that when consumer 
heterogeneity is considered, the design decision is in favor of concentrating on fewer 
functionalities while providing better performances for each functionality. That is, instead 
of designing a product that has many functionalities to satisfy every consumer, the design 
is more focused on the needs of a subset of consumers and creates better value for this 
sub-population. (This, of course, is an empirical result dependent on the population 
surveyed).   Such an observation motivates a need for designing a line of convergence 
products to further exploit the heterogeneous consumer needs.  Additionally, the 
proposed method does not account for competitors’ actions. The attributes of the 
competing products are assumed to be static and the subsequent entrants into the 
convergence product market are ignored. The action-reactions of competitors as well as 
the new entrants into the new niche market can be considered in the future research. 
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Moreover, the optimal design can be sensitive to the definition of “existing product 
categories” and corresponding average products. Finally, the proposed modular structure 
primarily reflects the configuration of physical modules. For many product categories 
such as consumer electronics, software modules are also critical features of product 
differentiation. One future direction is to explore how the designer can sustain the market 
penetration by selecting the appropriate hardware platform and a series of future 
improvements for the software modules. 
Research Thrust 3: There are a few ways to address the limitations of this research 
thrust in the future. First, the numerical procedure discussed in Section 4.3.1, in general, 
cannot be analytically proved to provide an accurate approximation to the value of 
interoperability metric. The future research can be conducted to determine the validity as 
well as the accuracy of the numerical procedure.  Meanwhile, the computational 
efficiency of the numerical method which computes the interoperability metric should be 
improved so as to integrate the model with an optimizer and explore a much larger design 
decision space.  Additionally, a more comprehensive understanding of consumer choice 
behavior is needed, particularly with respect to how consumers account for their 
subscriptions of services when they make purchase decisions for physical products. 
Finally, the assumption of “static competitions” can be relaxed to extend the framework 
by accounting for strategic action-reactions of the upstream market players (e.g., the 





APPENDIX: CHOICE BASED CONJOINT SURVEY FOR CASE STUDY IN 
RESEARCH THRUST 2 
 This appendix presents the design of the customer survey as discussed in Chapter 
3 (research thrust 2). The response data can be obtained from the online electronic 
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